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Abstract
Interlocal cooperation provides local governments with a third means of service
provision, after direct provision and contracting out, that allows problems to be
addressed at the regional level. Much of the academic literature on this topic places
appointed officials as those who take the lead role in these types of arrangements. This
research explores the involvement of elected officials, specifically city mayors, in
interlocal cooperation. Based on 64 responses from mayors in the southeast region, this
research finds statistically significant relationships between mayoral comfort level with
tasks associated with interlocal cooperation and a number of variables including city
size and racial homogeneity. Additional attention is paid to how elected officials
communicate with other governments and with the public in the cooperative context,
through both quantitative and qualitative data derived from the survey instrument.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In January 2014, the 169,000 square-foot Owensboro Convention Center in
Owensboro, Kentucky had its long-awaited opening. After over a decade of discussion
and delay, the creation of the convention center was the largest project within a more
than $1 billion multi-faceted program to revitalize the city’s languishing downtown area.
Spearheaded by the city’s mayor Ron Payne, the program received national attention
for the sizable tax increase that was approved to finance the project in the middle of a
politically conservative region. The convention center project was funded jointly by
Owensboro City, contributing $7 million, and Daviess County, contributing $20 million in
land and bond proceeds (Schneider 2011). Since its opening, the Owensboro
Convention Center has had quite the impact. According to Dean Dennis, the convention
center’s general manager, “With 424 events, attracting 189,748 attendees, we helped
the city book 8,238 (verified) hotel room nights, making an economic impact of over $25
million on our local economy” (Vied 2015).
In May 2014, the Tampa Bay Times reported on the proposed launch of the
Tampa Bay Advanced Manufacturing Skills Initiative, a German-style apprenticeship
program aimed at bringing high-tech employers to the Hernando, Pasco, and Pinellas
county area (Behrendt and Shopes 2014). Modeled after a similar program in North
Carolina, the program would provide an incentive for businesses to relocate to the
Tampa Bay area by creating a pool of new skilled workers. The program would first
place enrolled high school juniors into apprenticeships with high-tech companies in the
area in order to learn hands-on skills. Following graduation, the students would then
attend a community college or vocational school for an additional two years. Speaking
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on the proposed program, Hernando County Commissioner Nick Nicholson noted, “This
would be such a home run in my opinion… Three counties working together can really
enhance our opportunities.”
In January 2016, it was reported that after a year and a half of delay, the Sumner
County Consolidated E-911 and Emergency Operations Center is finally set to open in
June of this year (Yankova, Lee, and Cross 2016). One of the major setbacks for the
center was the realization that the project would cost $2 million more than originally
projected. Now at a cost of $4.8 million, the new center will unify emergency dispatch
calls for Sumner County, Tennessee and the cities of Hendersonville, Gallatin, Portland,
Westmoreland, and Millersville. The additional cost, attributed to larger than expected
construction bids, was finally addressed by Sumner County funding taken out of a $70
million bond approved in 2015 and through an additional $600,000 in state block grant
funding. Proponents of the project hope that the center will bring about improved
effectiveness and an elimination of redundant activity. As County Executive Anthony
Holt explained, “Right now, a call can be bounced three or four times before the proper
agency is notified. The center will be the location that will be called and then the proper
emergency agency will be contacted and sent to respond.”
A blighted downtown, an unskilled workforce, and a lack of coordinated
emergency services are each very different kinds of public problems facing cities today.
But the examples above have at least two common elements. First, each of the three
examples is taken from a state located in the southeast United States. The geographical
distinction is important because this region has traditionally held a politically
conservative orientation. Yet, despite these conservative ties, the local governments
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mentioned above have sought to solve their problems by turning to other governments
rather than the private sector. Second, and more importantly, by turning to other local
governments, problems are able to be addressed at a more regional level. When local
governments collaborate to solve regional problems, the practice is known in public
administration and political science literature as interlocal cooperation (ILC). Each of the
examples of local government activity mentioned above was authorized, structured, and
funded by an interlocal agreement, a formal resolution passed in each of the
participating jurisdictions. But are these examples of collaborative action unique or are
they representative of local government activity across the nation?
Since 1982, the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) has
administered a survey every five years on alternative service delivery (ASD) to the chief
administrators of all municipalities with city-type governments with a population of over
2,500 citizens and to all functioning counties (Homsy and Warner 2014). The survey
questions local officials about a variety of topics including the feasibility, implementation,
and barriers to private service delivery; returning service back to in-house delivery; and
the motivations and obstacles to entering into intergovernmental contracts. One of the
key areas of the survey is set of questions about whether service delivery is provided inhouse, privately, with another government or authority across a number of different
tasks. Services included in the survey are divided into categories such as public works
and transportation, utilities, safety, parks and recreation, cultural and arts programs, and
support services.
The 2007 edition of the survey revealed that the most common form of service
delivery across all service types is the traditional form of in-house or direct service
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delivery at 52 percent of respondent governments. But what about the remaining 48
percent of services? Interestingly, the survey finds that intergovernmental contracting, or
agreements between neighboring local governments, accounts for 16 percent of public
service delivery, which represented an increase of 5 percent since the 2002 survey. But
the story of intergovernmental contracting does not end there. Though the full reports
are still not publicly available as of the drafting of this report, the 2012 edition of the ASD
survey found that intergovernmental contracting is the only alternative service delivery
strategy that continues to grow, having increased again to almost 24% of all service
delivery in 2012 (Homsy and Warner 2014).
What the ICMA survey on alternative service delivery makes clear is that in
recent years, local governments are turning to each other more and more for their
service delivery needs. It is due to this increased utilization of ILC that my research
focuses in on this topic. Though there are a number of lines of inquiry already being
pursued in this area, I have chosen to examine one that is, to date, still underdeveloped.
My interest in interlocal cooperation, and the subject of this report, is how city mayors
are involved in this process, in terms of their involvement with the functional aspects of
cooperative agreements and their communication about cooperation with others.
In Chapter 2, I begin the discussion of mayors and interlocal cooperation by
compiling a literature review of earlier theory and research on the topic. Specific topics
covered include definitions and typologies, incentives and barriers, and theoretical
paradigms within which ILC might be discussed. The purpose of the literature review
chapter is twofold: First, I will examine and discuss the topic of interlocal cooperation
through the lens of academic literature in both political science and public
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administration. Second, the literature review sets the groundwork for the following
chapters by explaining why various factors may influence mayoral behavior in this policy
area. The literature review also highlights the fact that, while a variety of different
research avenues have been pursued concerning interlocal cooperation, there has been
relatively little discussion of elected officials and their role in ILC in the literature.
Following the literature review, I use the following two chapters to present original
research, conducted for the purpose of learning more about city mayors and their
attitudes toward interlocal cooperation. In order to obtain data for this research, a survey
instrument was submitted to 137 city mayors in cities within a ten-state southeastern
region of the United States with a population of greater than 50,000 residents, not
including the metropolitan area. Alphabetically, the states included in the survey are
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Tennessee. Qualifying mayors within these states received an
initial survey mailing, a follow-up postcard one week later, and a new survey and cover
letter three and seven weeks following the initial mailing as necessary. At the close of
the survey period, I received 64 responses out of a total of 137 surveys sent, a
response rate of just over 46%.
The choice of limiting the survey to only southeastern cities was both theoretical
and practical. From a theoretical perspective, focusing only on the southeast will provide
a foundation for future research by establishing that patterns of behavior are similar
among states within a geographical and political region and that sampling from within a
region is an appropriate practice. From a practical perspective, limiting the survey to
one region of the country cuts down dramatically on cost in terms of time and resources.
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The limited survey also allows for future surveys over a larger geographical area to be
refined to address emerging research questions. City size in terms of population was
used as a filter to include only those cities that are most likely to be sought after by
smaller governments to assist in the provision of public goods. The use of larger cities
also allows for an evaluation of the beliefs and opinions of a specific set of elected
officials. Given their experience as the executive of a large city, these mayors are
uniquely situated to seek higher office.
In Chapter 3, titled “Elected Officials & Interlocal Cooperation,” I examine
mayoral comfort with performing eleven unique tasks that mayors might perform in the
policy process of interlocal cooperation. The tasks are derived from multi-step models of
the policy process and include identifying problems, increasing public awareness,
informing and educating the public, networking, collaborating with public officials and
private parties, delegating power, creating specific agreement terms, implementation,
monitoring, and program evaluation. I perform Spearman’s rank order correlations for
each of these tasks and four variables that previous research indicates are important to
the decision to enter into cooperative agreements. These variables include city size in
terms of population, length of term in office, racial homogeneity of the city, and mayoral
interest in higher office. Additionally, I perform Mann-Whitney U tests on each of the
policy process tasks and two additional variables: the administrative structure, or city
type, and mayoral preference for either financial concerns or service quality.
Each of the explanatory variables listed above had at least one theoretical
reason for their inclusion in this research. In other words, there were expectations that
each variable would have a strong correlation with mayoral comfort levels with
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participating in tasks associated with interlocal cooperation. Because this research is
limited to measures of correlation and not causation, and because this research
represents an introductory exploration into this aspect of cooperation, these
expectations do not rise to the level of formal hypotheses within this research. Instead,
these expectations and statistical results represent a foundation for future lines of
research and theory building.
In very general terms, the following discussion describes the expectations for
each of the variables in this research. A summary of these expectations can be found
below in Table 1-1. First, city size has competing expectations when it comes to mayoral
comfort with these tasks. On one hand, mayoral comfort may be low because larger
cities should be more diversified or heterogenous in terms of race and other factors, so
mayors may not feel comfortable being involved in policy that could bring about
opposition. On the other hand, mayoral comfort could be high because mayors from
large cities should enjoy an imbalance of power with other communities seeking help
and thus can pick and choose the program with which they choose to participate.
The expectation for length of term in office is that with more experience, mayors
should feel more comfortable with performing tasks in the interlocal cooperation
process. Taking a somewhat pessimistic view of politics generally, the primary concern
of the city mayor, especially one having served a long term, is to maintain his or her own
office. That being noted, the name recognition brought about by a longer term in office
only builds a mayor’s electoral advantage over time. In general, longer tenured mayors,
therefore, can feel confident in their position and more comfortable taking chances than
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a less experienced official. These lesser experienced officials should not feel as
comfortable putting their career on the line should a cooperative effort result in failure.
As noted above, greater racial homogeneity, or lesser racial heterogeneity,
should result in greater comfort with performing tasks associated with interlocal
cooperation. Again, with a greater variety of groups, there are likely to be many different
viewpoints leading to greater debate over the proper course of action. Because there is
debate between viewpoints due to race, any action taken by a mayor is likely to
disappoint some portion of the population. Mayors, therefore, should feel more
comfortable when their city is more unified in terms of race because they can feel
confident that any action they take is more likely to be met with approval.
The expectations for interest in higher office are a bit more refined than the
previously discussed variables. A mayor that has an interest in running for higher office
in the future should be more comfortable performing interlocal cooperation tasks that
are related to communication but not those that are related to more technical tasks of
cooperation. In other words, mayors should feel more comfortable with discussing the
nature of the problem and possible solutions with the public because these tasks help to
build the mayor’s name recognition with a broader public. More technical tasks such as
drafting the specific terms of cooperation, however, would not be tasks that a politically
ambitious mayor would feel comfortable performing because it would do nothing to
improve their ability to attain higher office in the future.
With administrative structure, mayoral comfort should be higher among cities with
a mayor-council structure and lesser for cities with a council-manager structure. In a
mayor-council city, the mayor serves as the primary executive figure and has the power
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to make policy decisions. In a council-manager city, the mayor has comparatively less
power, as the primary executive actor within this city type is the city manager. The city
mayor in this type is likely to be either drawn from the city council by rotation or by
tenure. Given these characteristics, mayors from mayor-council cities should feel
greater levels of comfort because they have greater control over their own policy
activities, and council-manger city mayors have relatively less control and thus should
have lesser levels of comfort.
Finally, mayoral preference for either financial concerns or service quality has its
own set of expectations. Mayors that prefer to ensure that cooperation meets financial
goals are more likely to feel comfortable with more technical tasks of ILC, but not feel as
comfortable with the communication-based tasks. The reason for this distinction is that
by being involved in the more technical aspects of cooperation, mayors can ensure that
the terms of cooperation keep financial concerns in mind. Speaking to the public,
however, does little to help achieve this task. It is for these same reasons that the
opposite is true with regard to comfort levels for mayors that prefer service quality.
Service quality is a measure of how well received a policy is by the public. A mayor
wanting to please the public should be more comfortable communicating with the public
in order to ensure that their needs are met through cooperation. Speaking only with
policy experts, however, does little to achieve the end of service quality.
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Table 1-1: Explanatory Variable Expectations for Mayoral Comfort with ILC Tasks
Variable

Expectation(s)

City Size (Population)

Greater city population should lead to less comfort with
performing ILC tasks due to greater diversity.
or
Greater city population should lead to greater comfort with
performing ILC tasks due to relative power with other
communities.

Length of Term in Office

Greater length of term in office should lead to greater comfort
with performing ILC tasks due to strength of incumbent
advantage.

Racial Homogeneity

Greater racial homogeneity should lead to greater comfort with
performing ILC tasks due to less political opposition.

Interest in Higher Office

Greater interest in higher office should lead to greater comfort
with performing ILC tasks related to communication due to
ability to build brand name with future voters.
and
Greater interest in higher office should lead to less comfort
with performing ILC tasks related to technical aspects due to
inability to build brand name with future voters.

Administrative Structure

The presence of mayor-council structure should lead to greater
comfort performing ILC tasks due to greater control over policy
decisions.
and
The presence of council-manager structure should lead to less
comfort performing ILC tasks due to lesser control over policy
decisions.

Mayoral Preference

The preference for financial concerns should lead to greater
comfort performing ILC tasks due related to technical aspects
due to greater ability to ensure compliance with financial goals.
and
The preference for service quality should lead to greater
comfort performing ILC tasks related to communication due to
greater ability to address the needs of the public.
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In Chapter 4, titled “Political Communications and Interlocal Cooperation,” I
address questions related to how city mayors communicate with other public officials
and the public. In terms of communication with other public officials, this study began
with the expectation that mayors would communicate more frequently elected officials
from other cities rather than county leaders from either their own county or a
neighboring county. This expectation is based on the observation that mayors are more
likely to be involved in networking opportunities with other elected officials at the city
level than with county leaders. Additionally, in terms of the type of government involved,
there is an expectation that mayors from mayor-council governments would be far more
likely to have had discussions about interlocal cooperation with other public officials
than would mayors from the council-manager form of government. The mayor-council
form of government places more formal power in the position of mayor, so mayors of
from this city type should be expected to feel more empowered to take action than
would their counterparts in council-manager cities.
A second important feature of the research on mayoral communication in the
interlocal cooperation setting is the relationship between mayors and the public,
especially as based on past experience. This relationship may even be more important
to the elected official in particular because without public support, a cooperative policy
failure could lead to negative results in future elections. In terms of their communication
with citizens and citizen groups about interlocal cooperation, mayors should be
expected to feel more comfortable performing public communication-type tasks when
they have experienced higher levels of activity and productivity in the past. This should
be the case because higher levels of activity and productivity should convey positive
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reinforcement to mayors that citizen engagement is worth their efforts. Conversely,
where mayors have viewed citizens and citizen groups as inactive or not productive, this
should have sent a negative message to mayors about their future citizen engagement
efforts. The type of task in question is also important because some communication
tasks involve less potential public scrutiny than others. Generally speaking, mayors
should be far more comfortable with the task of informing the public about the nature of
the problem than informing and educating the public about possible solutions. Whereas
the nature of the problem may be generally agreed upon, mayors may experience
greater levels of public scrutiny when delivering support for one policy over another.
Finally, Chapter 4 includes the responses to several quantitative questions about
the types of activities performed in the past to include the public in discussions of
interlocal cooperation with neighboring communities and activities that they would like to
perform in the future. Though these questions are included in large part to capture
information not anticipated or expressly covered by this survey, the general expectation
is that mayors either will not include the public or will use traditional methods of public
engagement such as town halls. The expectation of zero public engagement is based
on the assumption that the topic of interlocal cooperation may be too complex for the
public in the eyes of the mayor or that the public will have no interest. This may also be
a reflection of what mayors personally understand of interlocal cooperation. In other
words, if a mayor feels that he or she does not understand the topic, then how could the
public comprehend the types of complex plans often involved in regional governance?
Alternatively, mayors may simply seek out traditional methods of engagement because
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they are familiar with these types of activities and because complicating the
engagement process may further confuse an already complicated policy process.
Finally, in Chapter 5 I conclude with a summary of where future research on
elected officials and interlocal cooperation should proceed based on the questions that
emerged from subsequent literature and as a result of my own research. Among the
topics that require future research are a detailed state-by-state comparison of statutes
authorizing interlocal cooperation, analysis and comparison of interlocal cooperation
training of elected officials through state municipal leagues, and a more nuanced
examination of the impact of race on cooperation. As noted from the outset, scholarship
concerning this type of regional governance is gaining increased interest, and I believe
that my research has identified many future avenues for examination.
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Chapter 2: Interlocal Cooperation Literature Review
“Laws, like sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as we know how they are
made.”
- John Godfrey Saxe, Lawyer-Poet (1816-1887)
“Too many cooks spoil the broth.”
- Proverb of Unknown Origin
If for only just this once, food-based metaphors can provide some insight into the inner
workings of local government. Interlocal cooperation (ILC) is a means of allowing
multiple local governments within close proximity of one another to come together to
solve regional challenges more effectively than they could either on their own or through
a partnership with a private entity. As an alternative to in-house production and
contracting out to the private sector, these collaborative ventures return at least partial
control of service provision responsibility to government. ILC also allows governments
to combat region-wide problems that have grown in number and intensity while also
capturing the efficiency benefits of a larger market (Feiock, Tao and Johnson 2004).
Research reveals that this form of service provision is now so common that a majority of
cities and counties are involved in at least one form of interlocal agreement (Chen and
Thurmier 2009, Agranoff 1989, Henderson 1984, United States Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations 1985).
But, as Saxe suggests of laws generally, the process of creating and
implementing these collaborative policies can be messy and challenging. Not least
among the factors that contribute to this mess is the number of actors that participate in
cooperative efforts, including but not limited to citizens, appointed officials, and elected
officials both within and outside of a single jurisdiction, each vying for their opportunity
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to create an agreement fit to their taste. The purpose of this research is to learn more
about one set of these cooks, elected officials. Before examining the empirical research
that is the basis of this study, it is necessary to dive into the essential features of
interlocal cooperation to see what other researchers in this field have already
discovered. The following literature review will proceed in four major sections: First, I will
compile a variety of definitions of ILC found in the relevant academic research,
administrative texts, and state law. Second, I will discuss some of the more important
benefits and costs associated with entering into ILC arrangements. The third section will
discuss three broad theoretical frameworks within the political science and public
administration literature that others have used to help explain ILC. In conclusion, I will
summarize the major sections of this chapter and, based on this background, present
the research topics of the two following chapters. Through this process, I hope to whet
the reader’s appetite for a more thorough understanding of interlocal cooperation and
how elected officials can be better utilized to serve their constituents.
I.

Definitions of Interlocal Cooperation

My own research is based on a 2015 survey of city mayors and their opinions and
beliefs about interlocal cooperation. 1 The survey instrument that is the basis of this
research limits the definition of interlocal cooperation to, “the sharing and contracting of
local government services with other local governments.” Some of the services
commonly provided through these arrangements include law enforcement, fire

For the sake of the reader, I will interchange use the terms interlocal, intermunicipal, intergovernmental,
and interjurisidictional as well as the terms agreements and cooperation, drawing distinctions when
necessary. The terms “interlocal” and “intermunicipal” are not synonymous with “intergovernmental” or
“interjurisdictional” outside of the context of this research given that either of the latter terms could be
used to refer to arrangements involving larger units of government (state or federal).
1
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protection, emergency medical response, data processing, community and economic
development, city utilities, electrical power generation, public transit, and library services
(Miller and Davidson 2015). As will be clear from a review of academic research,
government texts, and state law, however, the boundaries of interlocal cooperation are
quite expansive. By examining broader definitions and typologies of the term, it may be
easier to understand the limitations of my research and the possibilities for applying the
research in a different context. I conclude this section of the research by restating my
more limited definition of interlocal cooperation, and providing justifications for its use.
Basic definitions of interlocal cooperation from academic literature include many
of the same features, but tend to differ about the scope of what is considered interlocal
activity. Bickers, Stein and Post (2006) state that, broadly defined, interlocal cooperation
“includes all policy activities that require some level of policy coordination between local
governments” (4), while Bickers and Stein (2004) state that the purpose of cooperation
“is motivated by a desire to achieve a shared goal or preference that could not be
realized by solitary action” (804). Finally, Skuzinski (2015) defines interlocal cooperation
as: “discretionary, purposive action among the officials of two or more units of local
government to address an issue that could not be addressed as well (in terms of
effectiveness, efficiency, equity, or another criterion of importance to local actors)
without coordination of resources” (4). These definitions are representative of broadest
definitions of interlocal cooperation, definitions that feature “policy coordination” and
“achieving a shared goal.” These definitions represent the ideal type of cooperation in
which no single jurisdiction dominates the policy relationship for their sole or dominant
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benefit. In reality, however, resource asymmetries between parties and other factors
may lead to this ideal type not being met.
Whether stated as “policy activities” as in Bickers, Stein and Post (2006) or as
“address[ing] an issue” as in Skuzinski (2015), it is important to remember that interlocal
cooperation is a type of governmental action and is based on a statutory framework and
certain funding requirements at the state level (Andrew and Hawkins 2012). As an
example of a statutory framework for ILC, the Tennessee Interlocal Cooperation Act (§
12-9-101 through 12-9-112) states that the purpose of the law is:
“…to permit local governmental units the most efficient use of their powers by
enabling them to cooperate with other localities on a basis of mutual advantage
and thereby provide services and facilities in a manner and pursuant to forms of
governmental organization that will accord best with geographic, economic,
population, and other factors influencing the needs and development of local
communities.” (§ 12-9-102)
In Tennessee, the Interlocal Cooperation Act (T.C.A. § 12-9-104) permits any local
government within the state to enter into an interlocal agreement for any legitimate
government purpose with any other local government in Tennessee or in any other
state, so long as the local government outside of the state has the same authorization to
do so. While most states provide this sort of broad authority, there are also a number of
peculiarities between states. The state of Iowa, for instance, is unique in that it provides
a broad statutory framework with which to create regional agreements, but requires that
the formation of these agreements be filed with the State Secretary (I.C.A. § 28E.8).
Tennessee and similar state codes only require a filing with the state upon the creation
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of a “local government joint venture entity” (T.C.A. § 12-9-111). which the code defines
as “any entity created…, including, but not limited to, a self-insurance pool, trust, joint
venture, nonprofit organization, or any other type of organization that is sponsored,
owned, operated, or governed by two (2) or more local government entities as a
separate and specific activity” (T.C.A. § 12-9-103).
Just as Dawes and Préfontaine (2003) define collaboration as “a reciprocal and
voluntary agreement” (1), the Skuzinski definition refers to cooperation as being
voluntary or discretionary. This aspect of the definition has some exceptions, as there
are several examples of state-mandated collaboration, such as among counties in
open-space protection (Smith 2009) and in the case of interlocal financial transfers
(Bickers and Stein 2004). Like other government mandates, mandated interlocal
cooperation may face ideological scrutiny by those opposed to top-down intrusion into
local matters. This type of opposition might not be unjustified, as Andrew and Hawkins
(2012) find that when mandated or strongly encouraged by incentives from higher levels
of government, local governments are often left with little direction as to the type of
agreement to be employed. Additionally, even voluntary agreements may involve
services that are mandated to be provided in some form by counties (though not cities)
(Jung and Kim 2009), are subject to state-mandated caps on local taxing and spending
(Hawkins 2011), and may require statutory support from state government (Feiock
2008), though these qualifications in and of themselves do not rise to the level of a
government mandate.
The Skuzinski (2015) definition also highlights a basic though important feature
of interlocal cooperation—it always involves two or more units of local government.
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Most interlocal agreements involve only two local governments, but others are
multilateral

agreements (MLAs) involving three or more actors (Andrew 2009). The

types of government actors involved can include a city, county, special district, or other
specialized agency such as an emergency management agency (Andrew and Hawkins
2012). In addition to governmental actors, third party actors from profit or non-profit
organizations can be involved in interlocal cooperation. Third party organizations may
serve on the front lines of providing a public service but may also serve to resolve
disagreements, facilitate collective action, and monitor to ensure that program
objectives are met as agreed upon (Hawkins 2009; Ostrom 1990). Hawkins (2009) also
notes that third parties “may provide incentives, such as monetary assistance, that can
shape the decision of a community to cooperate with other government units in the
region” (110). Beyond simply understanding the structure of these agreements, knowing
that multiple parties are involved lends insight into the kinds of problems that might arise
and the types of mitigating steps that might be necessary to prevent them. As the
number of participants to an agreement increases, so too do the opportunities for
coordination problems, as well as the costs associated with monitoring and imposing
sanctions on participant activity (Andrew 2010). In order to mitigate risks when dealing
with a formalized agreement, the design of the agreement is given careful
consideration.2
Distilling these definitions down to their essentials, a good definition of interlocal
cooperation should consider the following components: 1) policy activities, 2) based on
See, for instance, Andrew and Hawkins (2012) for an in-depth comparison of adaptive contracts, those
providing broad discretion and flexibility for future changes, and restrictive contracts, those providing
procedural safeguards and clearly stated outcome requirements, and in what kinds of situations each of
these contract designs is most appropriate.
2
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state statutory authority, 3), between two or more governments, 4) that are voluntarily
entered into, 5) to achieve a shared goal that could not otherwise be achieved as
efficiently or effectively alone. This last point of the definition will be discussed more
thoroughly in next major section of this chapter. Before discussing two important
typologies of ILC, however, Zeemering (2008) adds one final note to these definitions by
referring to interlocal agreements as “innovative governance arrangement[s]” (731). The
“innovative” nature of interlocal cooperation is due in part to its newness or the recency
with which these methods have been relied upon, at least relative to more traditional
methods of public service. But interlocal cooperation is also innovative in the sense that
it provides local governments with less rigid means of solving problems. It is precisely
this freedom to act which should be so exciting to practitioners and academics alike
when speculating about the future state of local governance.
a. Interlocal Cooperation Typologies
Academic definitions of interlocal cooperation provide increased explanatory power as
their examination becomes more nuanced. When possible, the formation of typologies
allows social scientists to form and refine concepts, draw out underlying dimensions,
create categories for classification and measurement, and sort between cases (Collier,
LaPorte, and Seawright 2012). Typology creation in the field of interlocal cooperation is
especially important given its relative infancy in the academic research. The following
discussion will focus on two typologies of interlocal cooperation that view the subject
through two very different lenses. The first typology presented in Collins (2006)
distinguishes between interlocal agreements based on the arrangement of responsibility
between parties in the deliverance of a public service. The second typology from
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Warner (2011) distinguishes between types of interlocal cooperation by their level of
formality and the number of purposes involved in each. Despite differences in their
focus, both typologies are useful means of evaluating and comparing specific instances
of interlocal cooperation.
Detailed below in Table 2-1, the Collins (2006) typology distinguishes between
forms of interlocal agreements based on the arrangement of responsibility between
parties in the deliverance of a public service. The first three types (joint service,
delegated agreements, and transfer of functions) retain control of services within
existing structures by sharing, delegating, or entirely transferring responsibility
respectively to each type. These types can be distinguished from consolidation of
services, which creates a new governmental structure for the activity. This typology is
important because it speaks to the role of large cities in cooperative ventures and the
possibility of power asymmetries between governmental parties. Future research could
utilize this typology by examining incidences of each type with regard to one or more
kinds of governmental activity. This research could evaluate whether arrangements
involving large cities are more likely to take on the delegated agreement and transfer of

Table 2-1: Interlocal Agreement Forms (based on Collins 2006)
Agreement Form

Definition

Joint Service Agreements

Two or more local governments cooperating to conduct an
activity

Delegated Agreements

One or more local governments designating another
jurisdiction to conduct an activity under their oversight

Transfer of Functions

One or more local governments transferring an activity to the
responsibility of another local government

Consolidation of Services

One or more local governments transferring an activity in
entirety to a new separate entity created to handle the activity
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functions type, or whether the absence of a large city tends to take on a more balanced
type such as the joint service agreement or consolidation of services.
A second useful typology of interlocal cooperation is found in Warner (2011), and
is detailed below in Table 2-2. One of the key distinguishing features of interlocal
cooperation is the level of formality involved in the creation of an agreement. Interlocal
agreements may be formalized, as with written contracts for service provision, or may
be informal agreements such as a handshake or “good faith” agreement that services
will be provided in a time of need. Warner (2011) places forms of interlocal cooperation
on a continuum of formality, ranging from informal to intermediate to formal. These
forms are further distinguished within that continuum by whether the activity is a single
function or multi-functional activity. In the informal category, Warner lists mutual aid
agreements as single function activities and councils of government as multi-functional
activities. In the intermediate category, Warner lists interlocal contracting alone as a
single function activity. Finally, in the formal category are single function special districts
and multi-function consolidated governments. The following discussion will describe and
provide examples of each of these types of cooperation.
Of the levels of formalized levels of cooperation, informal agreements are the
hardest for researchers to pin down. By their very nature, informal agreements lack any

Table 2-2: Continuum of Interlocal Cooperation (Based on Warner 2011)
Single Function

Multi-Function

Informal

Mutual Aid Agreements

Councils of Government

Intermediate

Interlocal Contracting

-

Formal

Special Districts

Consolidated Governments
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formal structure that can be easily studied, and often require the use of qualitative
interview techniques to discover. Andrew (2009) notes that while less formal
agreements are entered into, these agreements are often focused on short-term and
specific issues rather than long-term or regional policy issues. In general, agreements
that are larger in scope are more likely formalized through some type of legal resolution
(Collins 2006). The most common form of informal agreement in use among local
governments in the United States are mutual aid agreements (Warner and Hebdon
2001). Mutual aid agreements may occur in a variety of contexts including the sharing of
road maintenance equipment or aid in response to weather-related issues such as
floods or snow storms (Warner 2011). The benefit of mutual aid agreements, especially
in weather-related issues, is that they take advantage of “redundancy in equipment and
expertise that can be deployed… where more capacity than is normally available locally
is needed” (Warner 2011, 424).
Another, less common form of informal interlocal cooperation are councils of
government (COGs). The National Association of Regional Councils (NARC) defines a
COG, also known as a regional council (RC), as “a multi-service entity with state- and
locally-defined boundaries that delivers a variety of federal, state, and local programs
while carrying out its function as a planning organization, technical assistance provider,
and ‘visionary’ to its member local governments.” An example of a COG is the Knoxville
Regional Transportation Planning Organization (KRTP). KRTP membership includes
Knox, Blount, Loudon, and Sevier County; the cities of Alcoa, Clinton, Knoxville, Lenoir
City, Loudon, Maryville and Oak Ridge; the Town of Farragut; and the Tennessee
Department of Transportation and East Tennessee Development District.

23

Interlocal service sharing agreements, the subject of this research, falls within the
formal, single-purpose activity type of the Warner typology. The first distinguishing
characteristic of this type is that, unlike informal agreements, when formalized
cooperative agreements are created, they often require that city councils vote to
approve their adoption (Zeemering 2008). As a result, formalized agreements will have
a higher level of visibility and should, therefore, be subject to a higher level of public
scrutiny. Alternatively, as a subsequent chapter of this research will discuss, interlocal
agreements are often more technical and involve more actors than other forms of local
government policy and thus may escape public scrutiny due to their complexity. In
practice, there are a number of uses for formal service sharing agreements. Andrew
(2009) provides a list of contracting agreements often entered into by local
governments, which include fee-for-service contracts, arrangements for coordinating
service provision or sharing equipment or facilities, joint planning agreements, and
intergovernmental boundary agreements to share tax revenues from development,
coordinate land-use decisions, and negotiate other potentially contentious border
issues.
The Warner typology is unique in that it refers to interlocal contracts as an
intermediate form of cooperation rather than being a formal type within a formal-informal
dichotomy as is typically found in the ILC literature. The typology is also unique in that it
includes special districts and consolidated governments which are typically given their
own branches of research apart from the interlocal cooperation literature. Including
these more formal, institutionalized forms of regional cooperation, however, is helpful to
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provide a fuller understanding of the scale with which a variety of actors can come
together to solve regional problems.
b. Justification for the Use of a More Limited Definition of Interlocal Cooperation
As noted from the outset of this section, my own research questions mayors about their
involvement in a much more limited form of interlocal cooperation which I define as, “the
sharing and contracting of local government services with other local governments.” The
following will demonstrate that the narrow definition of interlocal cooperation
incorporated into my survey accounts for the essential elements of definitions found in
academic research, and draws necessary distinctions between types to include only
those that allow mayors to be included in the policy process.
To reiterate the earlier discussion, an ideal academic definition of ILC states that
it is policy-based activity performed under statutory authority between multiple
governments that is voluntarily entered into to achieve a shared goal that could not
otherwise be achieved as efficiently or effectively alone. While my limited definition
explicitly mentions a type of policy-based activity between multiple governments, the
other features of the academic definition should be implied. For instance, it seems
unlikely that an elected official would have in mind illegal or coercive agreements
between governments when responding to the survey instrument.
Where my definition of interlocal cooperation deviates from the above discussion
is in its contrast to the Collins and Warner typologies. The Collins typology contains a
“consolidation of services" type that would not be included under my definition. The
Warner typology contains similar types in "special districts,” singled-function activities,
and “consolidated governments,” multi-function activities, both of which appear to be
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more defined forms of the Collins type. The reason for excluding this type is that this
form of interlocal cooperation transfers power and control of the activity to a third party.
With my survey I am attempting to capture what mayors actually do within the policy
process. Similarly, the Collins typology also includes “delegated agreements” and
“transfer of function” types that could potentially take control of an activity away from a
city mayor. Including these types would confuse the issue because mayors would likely
not be involved in the policy process. That is not to say, however, that future research
would not benefit from examining mayoral decision-making in this policy context. It
would be interesting to investigate mayoral involvement in deciding whether to maintain
control of an activity or delegate to a third party, and the factors that go into making that
kind of decision.That analysis, however, is beyond the scope of my research.
Additionally, while my research makes a distinction between maintaining control
versus delegating to a third party, it does not draw a distinction between the level of
formality involved as in Warner. It seems likely that most agreements falling under my
narrow definition of ILC would be formalized, but it could also include informal decisions
that are simply agreed upon under good faith. The time involved and the level of detail
that go into the policy process of an informal agreement would seem to be less than that
of one that is formalized, but I believe that the same tasks investigated in my research
would be conducted. It also might be the case that formal agreements might evolve out
of long-standing informal agreements.
II. The Incentives of and Barriers to Interlocal Cooperation
While the preceding definitions of interlocal cooperation explain the forms that
cooperation can often take, therefore answering the “what” question of interlocal
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cooperation, there still remains the important question of “why” these agreements are
used or not. In other words, what incentives are there from seeking governmental
partners for service delivery, and what are some of the barriers that prevent cooperation
from being a viable option? Though the following discussion cannot cover all possible
incentives and barriers, especially those that are specific to certain kinds of policy
issues, there are a number of rationales that commonly appear in both academic and
governmental texts. In terms of benefits, in what follows I will discuss: 1) the presence
of fiscal constraints that encourage participation, 2) cost savings through the creation of
scale economies, and 3) building up or maintaining local interests by addressing
regional issues. I will conclude with a summary of additional incentives that are no less
important, though less frequently mentioned in the relevant literature. This discussion
will be followed by a review of some of the more important barriers that might prevent
interlocal cooperation, including the number of parties involved, the pursuit of individual
interests, and an inability to compromise. Finally, a section will be devoted to explaining
how these incentives of and barrier to interlocal cooperation have been incorporated
into my own research.
a. Avoidance of Fiscal Constraints
As with any form of government collaboration, the use of cooperative ventures between
governments means ceding some control over the formation of the agreement. Given
the choice between less control and more control over their own activities, it seems
likely that officials would choose to maintain control if for no other reason than to ensure
that project directives are followed through as planned. Unfortunately, economic reality
can often come between governments and the ideal of complete control. Often quoted
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in the more recent interlocal cooperation literature is Robert J. O’Neill, the Executive
Director of the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) who in 2012
made mention of the interplay of economics and local government policy in stating that,
“[T]he next decade will be a time in which the fiscal woes of federal and state
governments will leave local and regional governments on their own, struggling
to balance the need for innovation against the necessity of making tough
choices… it will also be a decade in which local government will lead the way in
developing creative solutions to extraordinary problems. There are a number of
reasons to be optimistic about this coming decade of local
government” (emphasis added). (O’Neill 2012)
While the presence of fiscal constraints may be a burden on other local government
activity, their avoidance serves as a benefit to be derived from creative processes such
as interlocal cooperation.
In a meta-analysis of academic literature, Bel and Warner (2013) further
demonstrate the importance of interlocal cooperation as a means of circumventing fiscal
constraints, noting that it is the most frequently used factor in analyses of interlocal
cooperation. Much of the theorization employed in this literature takes root in Tiebout
(1956), who predicts that increasing local tax burdens will push citizens to demand
governmental reform. While city officials are assumed to prefer the in-house production
of services, fiscal constraints created by “inadequate tax resources, a population
insufficient for the cost-effective provision of services with high fixed costs, or budget
deficits stemming from low population growth or outright decline” push local officials to
seek external means of service provision (Carr, LeRoux & Shrestha 2009, 416).
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Additionally, economic recession in the local fiscal environment, declining state and
federal aid, highly restrictive tax limits on local governments in some states (Andrew
2009), aging infrastructure, mandated service responsibilities, escalating pension fund
obligations, and an inability to compete globally for jobs (Benton 2013) have contributed
to the fiscally challenging environment faced by local governments.
Brown and Potoski (2003) note that of these fiscal constraints, contracting
scholars stress the importance of post-1978 property tax limitations in particular. As an
example of how property tax limitations are structured, California’s Proposition 13,
adopted by voters in 1978, mandates a property tax of 1 percent plus the cost of interest
on locally approved bonds (Wasi and White 2005). In addition, property is to be
assessed at market value at the time of purchase with future assessments to rise by no
more than the inflation rate or 2 percent a year, whichever is lower. The intended
purpose of property tax limitations was to reduce the role of government in society and
encourage more efficient government spending (Brown and Potoski 2003). To illustrate
the often absurd impact of restrictive property tax limitations, Wasi and White (2005)
provide the example of Warren Buffett who announced in 2003 that he paid “property
taxes of $14,410 (or 2.9 percent) on his $500,000 home in Omaha, Nebraska, but paid
only $2,264 (or 0.056 percent) on his $4 million California home” (59). Though property
tax limitations may have had a noble purpose, the Buffett example illustrates how they
have allowed homeowners to gain a windfall at the expense of meeting public budgets.
Though citizens certainly reap the benefits, Brown and Potoski find that tax limitations
create incentives for local government to find cheaper alternatives to internal
production.
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Many scholars believe that property tax limitations and other fiscal constraints
are not a temporary phase, but instead represent a “new normal” for local governments
(Carr and Hawkins 2013). In the midst of an unstable and restricted economic
environment, many options are available to local government including the consolidation
of administrative services with other governments, reduction or elimination of
investment in lower priority services, increased taxes to make up for rising operation
costs, reduction of employee benefits, freezing salaries, and percentage budget
reductions (Abels 2012). Abels, however, makes the point that public managers have
used these tools of efficiency to their effective limit due to the new political environment
characterized by the shortcomings of traditional revenue sources (i.e., property taxes
and state aid) and increasingly complex problems and issues. As alternatives to the
traditional tools available to local government, greater consolidation of tasks, possibly
through special districts, privatization, and interlocal agreements are available.
According to ICMA survey findings, 59 percent of municipalities cite “external fiscal
pressures, including restrictions placed on raising taxes, e.g. Proposition 13” as reason
to explore alternative forms of service delivery (Hefetz and Warner 2004, 181).
Research has shown that the choice of public over private vendors at a time of
fiscal stress is in part a result of past experience. Carr and Hawkins (2013) note that the
combination of fiscal, demographic, and political similarities, along with a history of
successful collaboration, tends to lead to further collaboration. In a study of thirteen
cities in Nebraska, Bartle and Swayze (1997) find support for the notion that fiscal
pressure is a reason for interlocal cooperation. Morgan and Hirlinger (1991), however,
do not find that fiscal stress is a major reason for contracting with other governments in
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a much larger study of 615 U.S. cities. Chen and Thurmier (2009) take a more nuanced
approach to fiscal stress in their finding that while fiscal condition of the local
government is a reason to enter into interlocal agreements, it is secondary to the more
primary concerns of effectiveness and efficiency (see also Hawkins 2009 where fewer
than 15 percent of local governments surveyed reported “resolve fiscal pressures” as a
rationale for interlocal cooperation). Taken together, this body of literature seems to
suggest that fiscal stress typically plays an important role in the decision to cooperate
with other governments but that whether this is the primary motivation is dependent on
the situation.
b. Creating Economies of Scale
Bel and Warner (2013) find that the creation of economies of scale is the second most
mentioned factor for why governments engage in cooperation. As noted above, the poor
economic environment that local governments are often faced with is conducive to
cooperative activities in order to capture cost savings. In addition to benefits such as
cutting redundant services and gaining access to services not previously available
(Hawkins 2009), interlocal cooperation allows for savings through economies of scale.
The concept of economies of scale has its theoretical origins in the production
processes of organizations (Drew, Kortt, and Dollery 2014). While “returns to scale”
refers to changes in the physical outputs created by altering inputs (such as labor and
capital) into a production process, “economies of scale” refers to whether the cost of
production varies as a result of input alteration. Applied to local government, the input
that is changed under governmental reconfigurations such as consolidation or interlocal
agreements is the size of the constituency being served by a government program. The
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goal of governmental reconfigurations is to identify an optimal size at which economies
of scale, or the fiscal benefits of a program, are maximized. In other words, the goal is
to find the point at which the average cost of a unit of output, a government program, is
at its lowest per consumer citizen.
Drew, Kortt, and Dollery (2014) note that larger local governments are assumed
to possess substantial economies of scale whereby citizens benefit from “from relatively
lower administrative costs, increased purchasing power, and improved utilization of
equipment” (635). Unfortunately, because not all governments represent large
constituencies, in-house delivery and privatization may cease to be viable options, and
instead cooperation with other governments is necessary in order to capture these
benefits. Somewhat surprisingly, however, cost savings in general may not always be
the primary consideration of government officials. In a study of interlocal agreements in
the Kansas City metropolitan area, Thurmier and Wood (2002) revealed that
administrators are primarily concerned with improving service effectiveness, and are
less concerned with governmental efficiency, even noting that costs or savings are often
not monitored. Similarly, Marvel and Marvel (2008) find that government-to-government
contracts are monitored far less intensively than the provision of the same services
when contracted out to a for-profit or non-profit service provider. The authors also
suggest that as public pleas for oversight intensify, governments are more likely to turn
to non-governmental entities. While these findings may be disconcerting to those who
treasure fiscal responsibility, an optimist might argue that, because public officials
understand the cost saving benefits of economies of scale, efficiency is assumed,
allowing for a greater focus on program effectiveness.
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c. Building and Maintaining Local Interests
The final major incentive of interlocal cooperation is the potential to build and maintain
local interests, especially among larger, more affluent communities, though this benefit
is not always evident. There is an abundance of research and conventional wisdom
supporting the argument that wealthier communities may not favor participation in
interlocal cooperation from both an individual citizen and community perspective.
Greene (1996), for instance, discusses the fact that wealthier individuals tend to be
more active and politically conservative, thus advocating for a lesser role for
government, including its role in service provision. Joassart-Marcelli and Musso (2005)
find in a study of the Southern California region that while poorer cities are more likely to
outsource and to prefer interlocal agreements, wealthier cities are more likely to select
service providers from the private sector (though see Wood 2006, for greater incidence
of interlocal cooperation among wealthier communities in the Kansas City region).
Further, in a model utilizing both U.S. Census and ICMA data, Jung and Kim (2009) find
that wealthier cities are able to provide their own services independent of interlocal
agreements, and are thus able to retain autonomy over their means of service
production. Carr and LeRoux (2005) even note that in the area of police and fire
services, “some places, particularly smaller, wealthier, suburban communities, residents
may hold a belief that the services offered by their jurisdictions are the best available,
and therefore seek to exclude non-residents from the benefits of that service” (2). Some
have even argued that because the desire for local autonomy is so strong among
wealthy communities, legal regimes should be altered to incentivize cooperation in order
to solve regional problems (Frug 1999).
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Despite these findings, there are dissenting studies. Wealthier communities may
possess an incentive to see local services improved in order to maintain or enhance
their own property values. For instance, smaller or less affluent communities may be
concerned about improving local conditions, while a larger or wealthier neighboring
jurisdiction may be pursuing a sort of preemptive, NIMBY (“not-in-my-backyard”)
strategy of keeping less affluent citizens from migrating to their area where they could
enjoy higher standards in public service. Additionally, Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) note
that wealthy communities may show more support for interlocal cooperation because
wealthier citizens utilize a wider array of services, can afford more specialized services,
and are more supportive of experimentation in service delivery. Support for ILC may
also arise where wealthier, more educated citizens able to foresee the long-term impact
of a program (Smith 2009).
Despite this discussion of community wealth and whether interlocal agreements
can help to build up or maintain community interests, it may instead be the case that
community wealth is not important to the decision about whether to enter into these
arrangements. In a study of public managers in Iowa, Chen and Thurmier (2009)
conclude that fiscal condition is not actually a primary consideration in agreement
adoption when compared with program effectiveness and efficiency. Alternatively, the
concept of community wealth may be too difficult for communities to assess. Andrew
(2009), for instance, calls into question the usefulness of community wealth measures in
stating, “Measures of levels or changes in the local property base, per capita personal
income, and government spending are commonly used as proxies for fiscal capacity
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and fiscal health more generally, but it is not clear whether these measures accurately
depict the financial condition of a community” (137).
d. Additional Benefits of Interlocal Cooperation
Finally, there are a number of other potential benefits claimed by advocates of interlocal
cooperation such as personal gain for public officials, risk aversion, ease of design, and
potential career advancement. A subsequent chapter of this research goes into detail
about benefits that elected officials might receive from participation in ILC ventures such
as improved political reputation (Bickers 2005) and the potential to gain electoral
support when running for higher office (Bickers, Stein, and Post 2010). On the
administrative side, Feiock (2007) identifies selective benefits for local leaders to enter
into collective agreements. City managers, for instance, can rely on a record of
successful service production through interlocal cooperation to advance their careers,
finding higher pay employment in larger cities.
City officials may also prefer interlocal cooperation as these agreements are
often considered relatively easy to design and implement when compared to other
regional methods of service delivery (Kwon and Feiock 2010, Stephens and Wikstrom
2000, Wood 2006). ILC can act to maintain and improve relations between local
governments. Wood (2004) finds that governments that are a party to interlocal
agreements “share common goals and values, which results in more trust, fewer agency
problems, and lower transaction costs” than public-private partnerships (Chen and
Thurmier 2009, 538). As alternative to privatization, local officials also use interlocal
cooperation to avert risk in services with high levels of asset specificity. Asset specificity
refers to “whether specialized investments are required to produce the service” (Brown
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and Potoski 2003, 444). Brown and Potoski find that at low to moderate levels of asset
specificity, internal production decreases slightly relative to external production. At very
high levels of asset-specificity, however, governments do in fact externalize production,
and that the primary contract partners for highly asset-specific services are other
governments. The authors conclude that as cost pressures rise with highly assetspecific services, governments seek to reduce the risk of opportunism by contracting
with other governments.
Finally, interlocal cooperation may provide service delivery benefits to local
governments when no other options are available. The 2007 ICMA service delivery
survey, for instance, finds that interlocal agreements serve as a preferred alternative to
service delivery in rural areas. As Warner and Hefetz (2009) note, “Rural governments
traditionally have had trouble attracting private vendors due to the high costs of serving
a sparse population and the limited number of rural governmental clients to attract
outside vendors” (5). In other words, interlocal cooperation serves a superior form of
alternative service delivery when too few private vendors allow for privatization to be a
viable option.
e. Barriers to Interlocal Cooperation
Though they are receiving increased attention in academic literature and greater use
among local governments, interlocal agreements are no panacea for all local
government service provision problems. There are a number of theoretical approaches
that have been used to explain the difficulties of interlocal cooperation including
resource dependence theory, collaborative management theory, and transaction cost
theory (Hawkins 2009). More recently the barriers associated with interlocal agreements

36

have been understood through the lens of Feiock’s institutional collective action (ICA)
framework. ICA has been used to investigate interlocal cooperation in a variety of
contexts, including grant coalitions (Bickers and Stein 2004), urban service provision
(Feiock 2004, 2007), economic development (Feiock, Steinacker, and Park 2009), and
regional management of natural resources (Lubell, Schneider, Scholz, and Mete 2002).
The main argument of this framework is that ICA will occur when the benefits of
cooperation outweigh the costs of service delivery as well as transaction costs. The
following will discuss the kinds of costs that might hinder ICA from occurring.
Feiock (2007) refers to the institutional collective action framework as a type of
second-generation rational choice model. While first-generation models are based on
the assumption that “individuals have complete information, consistent preferences over
outcomes, and seek to maximize material benefits (48),” second-generation models add
an additional focus on the context of collective decision-making. Heckathorn and Maser
(1990) provide an extensive list of contextual factors that might contribute to difficulties
in any type of partnership, including the number of principal parties involved,
heterogeneity among the principal parties, spatial dispersion of the parties, temporal
distribution of costs or benefits, the level of acceptable risk, non-transferability of costs
and benefits, and instability of contractual relations. Perhaps the most important
contextual factor influencing interlocal cooperation, however, is the addition of multiple
levels of preferences that must be considered in institutional collective action. Based on
these contextual factors, transaction costs can arise from five sources: bargaining,
information, agency, division, and enforcement costs (Feiock, Steinacker, and Park
2009; Inman and Rubinfield 1997, 2000). Feiock et al. (2009) note that bargaining costs,
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those associated with the process of negotiation, and enforcement costs, those
associated with monitoring and enforcing the contract, present only minimal problems to
interlocal cooperation. Bargaining costs come about largely as a result of delays in the
cooperation process, but most delays are minimal when compared with the length of the
actual agreement. Enforcement costs remain low first due to the nature of the good or
service being provided, especially in the case of financial transactions. These costs also
remain low because, when formalized, failure to perform means violating a legal
agreement. Much more problematic, however, are information, agency, and division
costs.
Information costs arise in cooperative agreements because institutions operate
without complete information (Heckathorn and Maser 1990). Given the lack of complete
information, the most feasible options are not always known to decision makers.
Heckathron and Maser (1990) note that early in the negotiation process there exists a
common interest in choosing a policy that will contribute to the collective welfare, but
that at this point in the policy process there is no confrontation between winners and
losers. The primary difficulty, therefore, is choosing the policy option that best generates
mutual gain from all involved in the agreement. A lack of information can also breed
distrust between parties where it may be assumed that one party to the agreement is
hiding information about possible benefits and costs from other members of the
agreement (Inman and Rubinfield 1997). In order to overcome the lack of complete
information about possible options, institutions must expend resources in the form of
search costs.
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The ICA framework assumes that, like individuals, governments have “identifiable
interests and the capacity to pursue them (Kwon and Feiock 2010, 877).” When dealing
with collective action at the individual level, agency costs arise when members of the
collective have divergent preferences. The problem of divergent preferences is further
compounded at the institutional level because not only might governments, serving as
agents, have varied preferences, but so too might there be varied preferences among
principals, or each government’s constituency. Ultimately, public officials are faced with
the question of how closely constituent demands address regional needs, and if not,
whether straying from those demands could result in a loss of job security for the
official.
Finally, division problems complicate matters as they bring into question whether
feasible options are equitable for all parties involved. Even after deciding that some
action is necessary, public officials may be unable to come to a compromise based on
the division of responsibilities and benefits within the agreement. Feiock et al. (2009)
note that, “The greater the homogeneity of the participants and the more clear-cut which
party benefits most, the higher the political opposition to a cooperative solution may
be” (258). According to Kwon and Feiock (2010), in order to improve joint outcomes
from cooperative ventures, institutions (agreements, standardized behaviors, or
authorities) must be developed.
f. Incentives and Barriers as Explanatory Factors
The importance of the preceding discussion on incentives of and barriers to interlocal
cooperation is that they inform our understanding of how elected officials might
approach these kinds of agreements. Elected officials, for instance, may see
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cooperation as a means to bolster their own electoral support by bringing about
community incentives such as avoidance of fiscal constraints, savings through
economies of scale, and building local interests. As will be detailed in subsequent
chapters, my research directly examines mayors and the values that they believe
should be maximized when entering into a shared service agreements. Among these
values to be maximized are the financial implications of the agreement, which can be
tied to fiscal constraints and savings, and service quality, which can be tied to building
local interests.
In terms of barriers, the institutional collective action framework draws our
attention to those related to information, agency, and division. Each of these barriers
can greatly impede a community’s willingness to enter into a regional cooperative
agreement. One of the key means of overcoming these barriers is through relationships
built upon continuing communication between local governments. My research
examines mayoral communication with officials from other local governments, in part, to
evaluate whether mayors, as a result of the frequency of their communication, could be
beneficial to overcoming these barriers. As will be clear from the following section on
academic paradigms for interlocal cooperation, communication not only allows for
barriers to be overcome through exchanges of information but is also instrumental in
shaping the final policy decision through persuasion and negotiation.
III. Interlocal Cooperation within Paradigms of Public Administration
The traditional understanding of government services, from law enforcement and fire
safety to road maintenance and garbage collection viewed local government as the
exclusive service provider. The basic metaphor of layer cake federalism would place

40

these services far below federal or state concerns, allowing for no overlap of
responsibility between layers. And there would certainly be no thought of more complex,
horizontal relationships between local governments or even non-governmental
providers. Over time these divisions would blur, with federal and state government
intervening into the realm of local operations. Local governments faced mandates on
certain activities by state government, while the federal government engaged in
redistributive policies to help economically disadvantaged local governments.
The 1960s marked a major turning point in local government service delivery, as
economic and public administration scholars began to endorse the market-based
solutions of privatization (Bel, Hebdon, and Warner 2007). Niskanen (1971), for
instance, was highly critical of government monopolies on public service delivery, noting
that they were likely to result in overproduction and inefficiency. Later, Savas (1987) and
others, suggested that greater efficiency and lower costs could instead be found
through the contracting out of services. Though privatization is often viewed as being
synonymous with the contracting out of services to private and non-profit vendors, it
actually encompasses a wide range of activities including asset sales, public-private
partnership financing arrangements, club forms of service delivery, and service
shedding (Warner 2012). The introduction of privatization strategies was meant to bring
about a number of advantages to traditional service production including increased
efficiency, in terms of lower costs, elimination of waste, innovation, and increased
consumer voice (Warner 2011, 2012; Savas 1987).
In many nations, however, privatization began to fall out of favor by the late
1990s as the movement’s results often fell short of expectations (Warner 2012). Brown
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(2008) notes that while privatization, and contracting out specifically, may promise
efficiency, cost savings, and innovation, it also has a number of potential downsides
including corruption and nepotism, fractured accountability, diminished service quality,
and the “hollowing” of the State. In fact, research has shown that the benefits of
contracting out are limited and may erode over time (Bel et al. 2007, Hodge 2000,
Boyne 1998). While privatization techniques turn to the private sector for service
provision, government still remains responsible and accountable for the delivery and
finance of public services. For some services, the cost savings of privatization may be
negated by the cost of maintaining service capabilities as a contingency plan in the
event of a private vendor’s failure to perform.
One of the key selling points of privatization is that while government produces a
wide variety of services, market vendors produce only one or a few services over which
they can gain a higher level of expertise than their government counterpart. If this is the
case, the expertise of market vendors can be relied upon to produce more innovative
service delivery solutions, resulting in higher levels of effectiveness and efficiency. In the
area of environmental concerns, Warner (2011) calls into question the ability of
privatization to produce innovative solutions to public problems: “Innovation does not
just require the private profit motivations of entrepreneurs, increasingly we recognize
that to tackle environmental sustainability concerns we need a more deliberative and
collaborative space to imagine alternative possibilities — beyond those the market
deems competitive today” (422).
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a. Finding a Theoretical Home for Interlocal Cooperation
The traditional mode of public service proved to be too inflexible, while the promise of
privatization reforms have often come up short. In their place, a new approach emerged
that focused not only on cost efficiency but also service quality, market contestability,
and citizen voice. Cooperation between local governments serves as one of many
solutions to newer, more complex problems. But where does this kind of government
action fit within a broad, theoretical framework? Three theoretical niches where
interlocal cooperation and similar governmental tools exist are 1) Issue Network Theory
as first explained by Heclo (1978), 2) the New Public Governance as detailed by
Salamon (2002), and 3) Regime Theory of Governance of Frederickson (2005).
First, interlocal cooperation and its reliance on multiple actors both in and out of
government could be viewed as representing an extension of issue network theory, as
discussed in Heclo (1978). In his discussion of the history of issue networks, Heclo
noted that state and local employment grew at a much faster rate than federal
government employment between 1955 and 1977, due in large part to an array of more
challenging issues requiring greater participation between the different levels of
government. These same issues also mobilized private and semi-private organizations
looking to claim some control over emerging policy issues. As a result of the
strengthening of state and local government and non-governmental bodies, the
traditional “iron triangles” of government were in some instances supplanted by “issue
networks.” Issue networks “comprise a large number of participants with quite variable
degrees of mutual commitment or of dependence on others in their environment (275).”
In other words, rather than an easily identifiable set of actors with an influence on policy,
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issue networks seek to solve complex problems by employing a loose alliance of
governmental and non-governmental actors.
Interlocal cooperation at the state and local level of government operates in a
manner similar to issue networks. Andrew and Hawkins (2012) provide a definition that
highlights the complex nature of interlocal agreements, as those agreements which
“enhance regional cooperation by integrating activities vertically and horizontally among
different units of government and enable local governments to cope with problems
arising from a polycentric governance system” (460). Though traditional policy concerns
may be more easily dealt with in-house, problems that cross jurisdictional borders may
require different means of government problem solving. Interlocal cooperation provides
an alternative to in-house service delivery (analogous to “iron triangles”) by
incorporating multiple actors, and placing emphasis on bargaining and negotiation to
achieve shared goals much in the same way that issue networks operate (Zeemering
2008; Agranoff and McGuire 1999).
A more modern and precise theoretical home for interlocal cooperation comes in
the form of the New Public Governance (NPG) approach. Salamon (2002) provides a
useful overview of NPG and draws contrasts to earlier public administration paradigms.
Taking a broad perspective, Salamon makes note of the words used to describe two
important features of the paradigm. First, rather than “government,” the use of
“governance” indicates that problem solving will require the collaboration of many
partners from within and outside of government. This same notion can be found in other
works such as Garvey (1997), who uses the term “governance” to distinguish between
traditional public administration as founded on the politics-administration dichotomy with
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its separate sphere of appropriate governmental activity and new theories of public
administration that are reliant on diffuse network for public service provision. Second,
while collaborative ventures are not “new” strictly speaking, these collaborations “must
now be approached in a new, more coherent way, one that explicitly acknowledges the
significant challenges that they pose as well as the important opportunities that they
create” (Salamon 2002, 8).
Salamon goes on to describe many of the more specific features of the New
Public Governance paradigm. Of particular importance to the discussion of interlocal
cooperation are the focus on organizational networks, the cooperative relationship
between the public and private sector, and the importance of negotiation and
persuasion. The first of these features, the focus on organizational networks, is
particularly important because it relates to the basic structure of interlocal cooperation.
Whereas traditional notions of public administration relied heavily upon the commandand-control benefits of hierarchical government agencies, the organizational networks of
New Public Governance allow for shared responsibility across a number of
governmental and non-governmental actors. Though centralized control is lost in these
arrangements, government gains valuable allies that are often close to the communities
that they serve.
The focus on organizational networks within New Public Governance also sets it
apart from New Public Management and privatization in that the latter approach each
hold an assumption that government and its private partners will have shared goals,
whereas NPG advocates rely on principal-agent theory and network theory to show that
this may not necessarily be the case. Principal-agent theory focuses on the relationship
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between principals who make rules and their agents who carry out those rules. This
theory posits that agents will come to know more about the processes that they are
carrying out than their principals. Recognizing this knowledge disparity, agents may take
advantage of the opportunity to shirk on their responsibilities unless principals are
willing to acquire greater knowledge about their activities at great cost to themselves. In
other words, the disparity in knowledge between principal and agent may lead to a
disparity in goals between the two as well. Applied to privatization, the government as
principal could be subject to these moral hazards when working with private sector
agents in public service delivery.
Network theory further adds that even when principal and agent values align,
indirect tools of governance such as interlocal cooperation provide significant
management challenges for the principal. To explain why these interactions are so
difficult to manage, Salamon (2002) relies on four key attributes of network theory (13).
First, “pluriformity” tells us that because networks engage a wide range of actors, each
actor will have only a limited amount of experience collaborating with and information
about each other actor. In the case of interlocal cooperation, such a lack of experience,
understanding, and trust between parties can bring about program failure. Second,
“self-referentiality” refers to the fact that the multiple actors within a network will each
have their own perspectives and incentives. As discussed above in the section on
barriers to interlocal cooperation, this challenge is compounded by the fact that both
public officials and their constituents may not share the same perspectives on public
policy.
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Third, the network theory concept of “asymmetric interdependencies” notes that
while all actors within a network are dependent on each other, disparities between the
parties in terms of urgency of need or resources place the parties at an imbalance. This
characteristic of networks is often present in examples of interlocal cooperation
involving “hub” cities or larger markets that serve as a go-to partner for smaller
jurisdictions that surround it. Finally, “dynamism,” Salamon (2002) explains, is an
understanding that each of the aforementioned features of networks, in other words, the
range of familiarity, incentives, and dependence on one another, are subject to change
over time. Dynamism in the context of interlocal cooperation is especially important to
recognize early in the policy process because the flexibility or rigidness of an agreement
can be decided upon in order to account for possible changes. Taken together, these
four features of network theory allow government officials to more thoughtfully consider
the challenges of networked governance rather than assuming away the problems
inherent in NPM and private contracting.
The second major feature of the New Public Governance paradigm that is visible
in interlocal cooperation is the more positive, less adversarial, relationship between the
public and the private sector. As Salamon (2002) states, NPG does not favor either the
public or private sector but instead represents a “blend” of these sectors, each retaining
their own individuality in collaboration, not competition, with one another (14). While it is
true that interlocal cooperation, for instance, necessarily requires the presence of two or
more public sector entities and does not at all require private sector interaction, private
sector partners are not viewed as the sole means of achieving governmental goals (as
in privatization) nor as anathema to those purposes either (as in traditional public
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administration theory). It is this individuality or separateness from government, in fact,
that makes private sector involvement in interlocal cooperation so attractive, such as in
instances of program monitoring where government may not possess the ability to be
unbiased about its own performance.
Third, like Heclo’s issue network approach, New Public Governance places an
emphasis on negotiation and persuasion. Whereas traditional public administration
places control in a centralized government and privatization takes directions from the
market, networked government maintains government control but with management that
provides incentives to the actors over which they lack perfect control (Salamon 2002,
15). The results of interlocal cooperation will almost always represent a compromise
position between different jurisdictions and even within those jurisdictions there may be
those for and against cooperation. Given the likelihood that constituent proponents of
cooperation may not get all that they hope for out of cooperation and that opponents will
be dissatisfied with any form of cooperation, government officials may see other forms
of service delivery as more politically safe routes to take. With the possibility of a hostile
political environment, cooperative leadership must be willing to bargain and persuade in
order to overcome this and other potential hurdles.
Finally, interlocal cooperation finds a theoretical home in the Regime Theory of
Governance (Frederickson 2005). Frederickson explains that the term “governance” has
come to mean many different things, and that a useful approach for clarifying what that
term means would be to employ regime theory from the field of international relations.
Doing so, Frederickson identifies a new governance theory in three parts:
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“(1) vertical and horizontal inter-jurisdictional and inter-organizational
cooperation; (2) extension of the state or jurisdiction by contracts or grants to
third parties, including sub-governments; and (3) form of public non-jurisdictional
or nongovernmental policy making and implementation.” (Frederickson 2005,
294)
Taken together, Frederickson then defines “governance” as “a distinct form of public
administration, [that] has to do with the extension of the state or jurisdiction either
beyond its boundaries, through third parties, or by nongovernmental institutions” (295).
The first part of this definition, which Frederickson refers to as inter-jurisdictional
governance, consists of three features, 1) governmental and non-governmental actors
representing their interests, 2) in a voluntary form of cooperation, and 3) almost
exclusively within a specific policy area. Clearly, based on this definition of interjurisdictional governance, interlocal cooperation falls within this theoretical framework.
What makes this framework so attractive as a means of studying ILC is that it first
narrows the definition of what should be considered “governance.” Second, and more
importantly, this framework allows for the same logic and accumulated knowledge that
helped to evolve the concept of regime theory in international relations, which existed
far earlier than governance theory in public administration, to be applied to how we
study and think about interlocal cooperation.
Though each of these theoretical approaches has something to contribute to the
discussion of interlocal cooperation, my own preference for this research is to consider
mayoral involvement through the lens of New Public Governance. Again, NPG places
an emphasis on bargaining and persuasion, and I see those roles as being particularly
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suited to elected officials given their experience in the campaign setting. Many of the
tasks of mayors in the ILC process that I examine in this study, such as collaboration
and delegation to other parties, would necessarily have to be based on finding some
form of common ground with others. It is unlikely that even the crafting of the specific
terms of agreements would be done unilaterally and would require some give-and-take
on the part of the official. In other words, the tasks that are evaluated in this study
should be viewed with an underlying assumption that mayors are utilizing their
experience as a communicator to try an reach an optimal outcome for his or her
jurisdiction.
V. Conclusion
The purposes of this chapter are to discuss and examine interlocal agreements
generally and to provide some insights into how mayors might view their potential
involvement in this form of service delivery. One thing that should be very clear from the
review of this literature, however, is that it does very little in the way of directly
addressing the topic at hand. In fact, there has been very little in the way of research on
this topic and even less theory to help explain how mayors fit into the picture of
interlocal cooperation. Still, there are several insights that we can try to draw from the
existing literature. First, the very definition of interlocal cooperation notes that it is a form
of government action, and for many, the face of the government is the executive. In
order to bring out positive outcomes through regional policy, mayors should be involved
in the process not only to utilize their experience as communicators, but also to fulfill the
representative role that citizens place upon them as well. In the next chapter, I propose
that there are a number of different tasks that mayors can take on in the ILC process,
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and seek to explain why mayors may or may not feel comfortable performing each. This
research is important because it moves beyond simply stating that mayors should be
involved in a general sense by examining what their survey responses might reveal
about how mayors might be best utilized across a variety of specific tasks. If those
involved in the ILC process know best how to take advantage of their skill sets, mayors
may be able to provide the kind of leadership that can benefit their community.
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Chapter 3: Elected Officials and Interlocal Cooperation
“It does not appear that leaders or their constituents are devoting much attention to
the cross-jurisdictional issues of regional governance, but they will need to start
doing so and provide leadership at the regional as well as the jurisdictional level.”
- James H. Svara (2008, S45)
This chapter on interlocal cooperation (ILC) examines how elected officials, specifically
city mayors, might choose to participate in this form of service delivery and why. This
chapter seeks to build upon the emerging body of research concerning elected officials
and interlocal cooperation. I will first provide a review of research exploring the
relationship of professional administrators and elected officials in interlocal agreements.
I will then detail my own research, which examines mayors of large cities and their
comfort level in performing certain defined tasks within the policy process of interlocal
cooperation. Through an analysis of survey findings of mayors across a ten-state
region, my research finds several statistically significant correlations between these
tasks and variables that are theoretically relevant to this form of local service delivery.
Following an earlier line of research by Bickers, Stein, and Post (2010), I examine the
popular notion that city mayors lack an electoral incentive to participate in interlocal
cooperation. I utilize political ambition theory (Schlesinger 1966) to examine whether
tasks associated with greater public engagement are especially appealing to mayors
who have identified themselves as being potentially interested in seeking higher office
at some point in their career.
The aim of this research is to understand more about mayors and their
involvement in interlocal cooperation. From an academic perspective, I want to explore
the possibility that mayors leverage success within the ILC context as a means of
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building electoral support, especially in races for higher office. Additionally, a more
detailed understanding of the activities that mayors would prefer to conduct in the ILC
process could aid future administrators in structuring the responsibilities allotted to
mayors and other parties to a cooperative agreement. Through their keen
understanding of political communications with the public and the media, elected
officials may be able to aid the ILC process in a number of ways such as increasing
public support and eliciting greater public participation in the policymaking process. I
believe that this study is timely in that ILC has been the subject of increased attention
over the last decade and that investigation of this topic will only increase moving
forward. According to ICMA findings on methods of service delivery, cooperative service
provision has shown continued growth, likely as a result of both fiscal pressure that can
make direct provision unfeasible and negative externalities that can make contracting
with the private sector unattractive.
I. Literature Review
The area of research devoted to elected officials has not received as much attention as
other aspects of interlocal cooperation, primarily because of the presumption that ILC is
a realm of public policy to be left exclusively to professional administrators. This
impression is found among prominent researchers in the field such as H. George
Frederickson, who stated plainly that, “[t]here are few incentives for elected officials to
spend much energy or political capital in the interest of non-constituents who cannot
vote for them” (1999). The primary incentive that is lacking in Frederickson’s estimation
is the possibility for elected officials to turn regional action into votes. Mayors of large
cities, for instance, would seem to have very little in the way of an electoral incentive to
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engage in interlocal activity since those that stand the most to gain by these
arrangements are non-constituents that are unable to vote in future city elections. In this
situation, the only opportunity for an electoral gain would be to hope that constituents
are informed enough to understand how their mayor was instrumental in the
cooperation process. But even then mayors would only be seeking to maintain the
political office that they currently hold. If retaining one’s own office is the only goal, then
locally targeted actions would most likely have a greater utility for these mayors than
regional policy solutions would.
The idea that interlocal cooperation should simply be left to administrators goes
deeper than just electoral incentives though. Due to the regional scope of ILC, the
length of term in office for appointed officials, and the more direct opportunity for career
enhancement, it is not unreasonable to see how administrators would be viewed as the
most appropriate governmental actors for these ventures. Again, the most fundamental
aspect of interlocal cooperation is that it is regional in scope. The basic nature of this
aspect of ILC, however, should not be overlooked when considering the appropriate
parties to be included among a pool of appointed and elected officials. With so much
emphasis on elections, elected officials can be blinded to the scope of issues as their
impact crosses jurisdictional borders (Frederickson 1999; Chen and Thurmier 2009).
Shielded from political concerns that require constant interaction with the public,
administrators can instead focus on reaching outside of their own jurisdictions to build
the kind of networks that can form the basis of regional policymaking.
Professional administrators also tend to serve longer terms than their elected
counterparts, providing them with a number of benefits when it comes to interlocal
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cooperation. First, longer terms contribute to the higher level of policy expertise among
administrators because they allow for extended involvement with professional
associations. These professional associations are likely to be comprised of other
administrators that may share a common educational background (LeRoux,
Brandenburg, and Pandey 2010; Frederickson 1999). Policy expertise is important
because interlocal cooperation, especially agreements establishing long-term service
provision relationships, are apt to be technical in nature, requiring the kind of expert
knowledge that an elected official is unlikely to possess. Possessing technical expertise,
as Raab (2002) suggests, may allow professional administrators to more quickly take
control as rapid change or technical difficulties occur than elected officials. Even before
beginning their terms, professional administrators should have a leg up on elected
officials in terms of expertise and how it contributes to effective cooperation.
Professional administrators are more likely to share common training, experiences,
values, and preferences with administrators in other jurisdictions than elected officials
who are more likely to come from a variety of different backgrounds (Frederickson,
Johnson, and Wood 2004). Given the lack of time and political limitations, professional
administrators should be able to build on this knowledge base.
In contrast, mayors are likely to find it difficult to build policy expertise due to
continued electoral demands, the growing number of cities adopting terms limits
(DeSoto, Tajalli, and Opheim 2006), and even the size of the constituency. As Oliver
(2000) discusses, residents in larger cities may be less involved in local politics, and
therefore less likely to bring local issues to light by contacting their elected
representatives. Without cues from their constituency, mayors may not know what they
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need to know when it comes to policy issues in their own area, let alone regional
concerns. In addition to greater policy expertise, longer terms also provide
administrators with a more long-term perspective of community needs, whereas elected
officials may only care about achieving more actionable short-term goals (Clingermayer
and Feiock 2001). Longer terms are especially beneficial to administrators because they
allow for proposals, even popular proposals, from elected officials to be delayed
indefinitely if they are adverse to regional concerns.
Finally, though elected officials may see little in the way of an electoral benefit for
participating in interlocal agreements, LeRoux and Pandey (2011) suggest that
professional administrators may engage in interlocal agreements to advance their own
careers. To support this argument the authors cite the high turn-over of city managers
(DeHoog and Whitaker 1990) and the fact that at least a quarter of city managers in
large cities in America have worked their way up from the same position in smaller cities
(Watson and Hassett 2004). The authors then tie ambition to interlocal cooperation by
citing Teske and Schneider (1994), whose work finds that city managers tend to emerge
as the primary policy entrepreneurs among local government actors and that successful
policy implementation is the best means of enhancing a city manager’s reputation and
career mobility. Taken together, not only are city managers viewed as having better
opportunity and expertise to bring about success in cooperative ventures, they may also
have a personal motivation to see policy succeed.
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a. Elected Officials in Interlocal Cooperation Research
In spite of all of the arguments for why public managers may be best suited to
participate in interlocal cooperation, the local elected official should not be written off
entirely. Studies of ILC are an emerging area within the public administration literature,
and new to this research field is an understanding of how elected officials can be useful
to this form of policy. Mayors are seen as “the most active elected officials in
intergovernmental relations” (Zeemering 2008, 733), but what else do we know to this
point? Often, elected officials appear in the ILC research as passing notes in a larger
work about procedure or the motivation of public servants. Procedurally, for instance,
we know that as interlocal agreements rise in formality, such as in the case of
agreements for the sharing of public services, elected members of a city council are
often required to ratify agreements through a formal resolution (Feiock 2008). But rather
than being relegated to footnotes or describing their activity simply as a final,
perfunctory role, elected officials can serve important roles in ILC and are, therefore,
deserving of closer examination. Based on an analysis of related literature, two of the
primary benefits of the involvement of elected officials are their connection to the
constituents and their ability to bring trusted governmental partners into cooperation
discussions.
The relationship that mayors have with their constituents is unique among local
public officials and serves as a potential benefit for any type of policy that might be
pursued. For many constituents, the mayor is “both the most visible person in the
community and, on questions of public policy, probably the most influential” (Salisbury
1964, 787). When local policy fails, citizens are likely to hold a mayor accountable, even
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when certain factors that would lead to policy success are out of the mayor’s control
(Arnold and Carnes 2012). An elected official that pursues policy that is contrary to the
wishes of his or her constituency does so at his/her political peril (Gerber and Gibson
2005).3 But far from the impression given in some of the academic literature, there is no
reason that regional and local interests cannot coincide. From the constituent
perspective, resolving a regional problem may prevent the intensity of the problem from
worsening. Alternatively, as suggested in the previous chapter, local citizens may want
to solve regional problems in order to prevent outsiders from relocating to their area for
its superior service provision. Elected officials may also recognize the possibility of
service-based citizen migration, and utilize interlocal cooperation to prevent the dilution
of their own electoral support (Bickers 2005).
Arguably the most important benefit of elected official involvement is the ability to
establish trust between parties to an interlocal agreement. Interlocal agreements are a
form of collective action in government where multiple parties must come to a mutual
understanding about the terms of the agreement. In other forms of collective action,
arriving at a mutual understanding can be difficult based on the value preferences and
resources that a party brings into the agreement discussions. The difficulty of reaching a
consensus is compounded in the case of interlocal agreements because it is likely that
not only will municipal leaders hold different backgrounds, but so too will the
constituents they serve. In reaching a consensus on a multi-jurisdictional arrangement,
public officials are given the difficult task of arriving at a compromise that will be
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Feiock (2007) notes that the preferences of city council members are more likely to match those of their
constituents in smaller geographic areas than in larger areas with at-large elections where council
preferences are more likely to match those of the executive.
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pleasing to both themselves and their varied constituents. Given the delicate nature of
this task, it is important that trust be established between the parties to the agreement
to ensure that the compromise that is agreed upon is the policy that is delivered.
An elected official can be beneficial to the agreement process through his or her
close connection to the public and to other elected officials. In the area of interlocal
cooperation, Feiock (2007) notes that trust and performance expectations are built
through repeat interactions and previous relationships among local officials. One setting
that provides such an opportunity for interaction and trust-building is membership in
social networks of administrators and elected officials (Carr and Hawkins 2013). Beyond
simply developing interpersonal trust, social networks may also serve as an important
source for policy ideas and regional cooperation. Policy-specific networks, such as
councils of government, which are considered a type of interlocal agreement, can
provide a venue for policy creation. Wood (2006), for instance, finds that mayors and
council members from the Kansas City metropolitan area regularly participate in
councils of government. Alternatively, more general assemblies, such as regional
planning commissions may provide for a more free discussion of past policy success or
current issues that might inspire cooperation.
b. Studies of Elected Officials and Interlocal Cooperation
One of the more prominent names in research on elected officials and interlocal
cooperation is Eric Zeemering. Two of Zeemering’s studies are particularly worth
reviewing because they form a basis for my research. The first study compares the
interests in interlocal cooperation between city managers and city council members in
the council-manager context (Zeemering 2008), while the second examines the roles
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that elected officials play within the interlocal cooperation context (Zeemering 2015).
Each study contributes to the notion, which is fundamental to my research, that the
policy process of interlocal cooperation provides a variety of opportunities for elected
officials to realize their own goals.
Zeemering (2008) examines city council members’ interests in the development
of interlocal cooperation and contrasts those interests with those of city managers.
Through a series of personal interviews, three areas are examined: entrepreneurship
and problem identification, the negotiation of cooperation, and public representation and
education. As will be detailed below and presented in Table 3-1, these interests
provided a basis for my own research, as I have taken these three categories and
expanded them into eleven, more specific policy roles within the interlocal cooperation
process.
In the first of these interests, “entrepreneurship and problem identification,” city
council members can choose to initiate the creation of solutions to regional problems.
As entrepreneurs, elected officials may be able to reduce costs and improve the quality
of public services. In addition to achieving these benefits, Zeemering explains that city
council members may be particularly suited to play the role of cooperative policy
entrepreneur due to their ties to the public and other government officials. Many city
council members have other occupations in addition to their political office. By being
embedded in the public, as opposed to working full time in government as is the case
with professional administrators, city council members are in a better position to hear
first-hand the complaints of citizens. The study also revealed that city council members
are already in regular contact with other public officials outside of any cooperative
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context, with 61.7 percent of interviewees reporting that they speak with other officials
“often” and another 29.8 percent reporting “some” communication (Zeemering 2008).
Taken together, elected officials appear to be more responsive to citizen demand for
action by being closer to the public than public administrators and may be particularly
well-suited to initiate regional solutions through their continued communication with
other public actors outside of their own jurisdiction.
The second interest is “negotiation of cooperation,” or the crafting of specific
contractual provisions in an interlocal agreement. The common argument that elected
officials are only jurisdictionally-interested, rational actors should lead to the conclusion
that city council members would not be concerned with such a technical role in the
interlocal policy process. Further, it might be supposed that elected officials would lack
the expertise to craft agreements that might involve the more technical aspects of
service provision. Zeemering, however, finds that city council members have overriding
considerations in finance and policy control that attract them to the creation of
contractual terms. Interlocal agreements often involve large-scale capital investment,
such as water and wastewater infrastructure programs, and a shift of authority over
these programs to a partnership or a network of actors. It is in the interest of elected
officials to become involved in the creation of contract provisions in order to gain the
benefits of an agreement but also to protect their own jurisdictions from burdensome
financial and control concerns. Zeemering also notes that elected officials have an
interest in ensuring the clarity and equity of distribution costs for citizens, administrators,
and future elected officials.
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Third, Zeemering (2008) discusses city council members’ interest in “public
representation and education.” From a rational choice perspective, the roles of
representative and policy educator would seem to be conducive to elected officials’
desire to please their constituents, as they allow officials an opportunity to shape
program perception with the public. Unfortunately, Zeemering notes that elected officials
report a lack of interest from the general public about interlocal agreements and that
elected officials instead often face program opposition from “small but mobilized groups”
(737). Though these pockets of opposition are small, they can generate enough
attention to derail government programs, negating months of contract negotiation.
Understanding the lack of general interest and the potentially destructive power of small
local interests is important because it allows mayors to focus on identifying potential
opponents and tailoring their messages about cooperation to mitigate their impact.
Zeemering offers a few alternatives to combat opposition such as the development of
new public participation strategies, a focus on the educational role in interlocal
agreement discussions, and training on consensus and coalition building.
Finally, Zeemering (2015) assesses whether local elected officials express
different levels of support for different roles in interlocal cooperation. Part of this study,
which I replicated in my own research, questioned elected officials about six different
roles that could be taken on in the interlocal cooperation process. These roles are
important because elected officials should show greater levels of support for roles that
correspond with their own strengths or interests. While the following roles, Zeemering
noted, do not represent an exhaustive list of all possible roles for elected officials, they
do represent a good starting point for research in this area. Four statements placed

62

mayors in a “protective” role, with two roles presented mayors as advocates for either
their jurisdiction or the jurisdiction’s employees and a second pair of roles related to the
protection of community identity and independence. According to Zeemering, officials
expressing a disposition toward protective roles should be less inclined to participate in
interlocal cooperation, as these types of arrangements can result in a loss of policy
control.
The final two roles pertain to relationship building within extra-jurisdictional
actors: one role seeking to benefit all involved governmental parties and a second role
focusing relationship building with other local governments and how those relationships
might be beneficial to one’s own political career. While Zeemering makes the point that
elected officials expressing an interest in building these relationships should be more
likely to favor interlocal cooperation, this final role related to political career interests
requires closer examination. Are elected officials advancing their own political careers,
and if so, how might interlocal cooperation provide elected officials with an electoral
benefit? The cynic will answer to the first question quickly with a resounding affirmation,
but the second question has largely gone unexplored in the relevant literature.
c. The Political Motivation of Elected Officials
The motivations of elected officials, at all levels of government, have been a major
subject of inquiry in political science, and many of the insights from other venues of
activity are pertinent to the examination of elected officials in this setting. One of the
preeminent texts examining the behavior of elected officials is David Mayhew’s
Congress: the Electoral Connection (1974). One of the key contributions of this work is
the argument that the primary motivating factor for behavior for members of Congress
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(MCs) is reelection. In furtherance of electoral goals, MCs participate in three primary
tasks: advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking. Whether the action is taking
advantage of the franking privilege (advertising), touting one’s success at bringing
federal dollars back to their jurisdiction through pork barrel policies (credit-claiming), or
announcing one’s position on an issue through a roll call vote (position-taking), the end
of each of these activities winning reelection. Though even Mayhew concedes that his
view of elected officials as single-minded, electoral creatures is merely an abstraction
by which officials might be evaluated, there is an undeniable logic to the notion that
without achieving reelection, any other political goals of MCs cannot be met (Mayhew
1974, 2004; Carson and Jenkins 2011).
Mayhew’s same argument about members of Congress can be extended to other
elected officials. It seems likely that city mayors would possess a desire for reelection,
even if that desire is not their sole motivating factor, and would utilize their own forms of
advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking in order to secure their office.
Successful interlocal cooperation, for instance, could provide mayors with an
opportunity for credit-claiming where agreements have led to decreased costs in service
provision or have resulted in positive outcomes such as job growth (Hawkins 2009;
Clingermayer and Feiock 2001; Steinacker 2004). LeRoux and Carr (2005), for
instance, suggest that elected officials may gain an electoral benefit by providing a
service through cooperation without increasing taxes. Research even suggests that, at
times, political ambitions can lead local officials to promote interlocal cooperation in
spite of weak demand from citizens (Kwon and Feiock 2010; Bickers, Stein, and Post
2010; Gillette 2000). In other words, local officials may in fact live up to Mayhew’s
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myopic view of electoral motivation if constituent demands are not what is actually
driving cooperative ventures.
It is difficult at first blush, however, to discern a way in which local officials could
benefit in an electoral sense by serving constituents outside of their jurisdiction. The link
between interlocal agreements and electoral motivation is much clearer when allowing
for the possibility that local officials, especially city mayors, might consider the possibility
of running for a higher office in the state or federal government. According to
Schlesinger (1966), political ambition can take one of three forms: “discrete” ambition
occurs when candidates desire to serve in office for only a single term; “static” ambition
occurs when candidates desire multiple terms within the same office; and “progressive”
ambition occurs when candidates desire to “climb the political ladder” by capitalizing on
success within one office to obtain an elected office at a higher level of government.
Like Mayhew (1974), Schlesinger posits that an official’s behavior will be dictated by his
or her electoral goals but distinguishes between the goals of these three very different
types. Prewitt and Nowlin (1969) clarify that the progressively ambitious politician is
more likely than the non-progressively ambitious politician to hold policy perspectives
associated with regional, state, and federal government. In other words, elected officials
seeking to improve their position may be predisposed to seeking out creative means of
regional problem solving such as interlocal cooperation.
Applying Mayhew and Schlesinger to mayors and interlocal cooperation, the
progressively ambitious officials should be motivated to participate in interlocal
cooperation discussions in order to enhance his or her career opportunities. Among city
managers, LeRoux and Pandey (2011) find support for this theory by noting an
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inclination toward selling public services to other local governments among
progressively ambitious managers. This study further notes that these same managers
are less likely to buy services from other jurisdictions, a finding that emphasizes the role
of progressively ambitious city managers as policy entrepreneurs. Among elected
officials, Bickers, Stein, and Post (2010) test this theory in a study of survey data from
108 cities on the incidence of interlocal agreements and electoral data of city council
members and mayors from those cities from 2002 to 2006. Interestingly, the authors find
what appear to be two contradictory findings. First, interlocal agreements appear to
inhibit the likelihood of progressively ambitious politicians from entering into races for
higher office. Second, interlocal agreements were significantly associated with a higher
rate of success among those who enter races for higher office. The authors argue that
these contradictory findings could indicate that where intergovernmental agreements
are numerous, progressively ambitious politicians are often unable to build support for a
bid at higher office. But when faced with an open seat or weak incumbent, progressively
ambitious politicians are able to use the success of intergovernmental agreements to
build support for their campaigns. In other words, interlocal agreements are a useful tool
when an opportunity presents itself but are not powerful enough to overcome support
for an incumbent that is not otherwise perceived as weak.
II. Research Questions & Study Design
The preceding literature informs us of several important points. Despite the traditional
understanding of public managers as the key players in interlocal cooperation, elected
officials can also perform tasks within this process beyond just ratifying agreements. In
fact, due to a number of factors including their connection to constituents, the ability to
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include trusted partners and the ability to serve as a policy entrepreneur, local elected
officials may be particularly suited to take part in cooperative ventures. The roles that
elected officials can play in the cooperative process are diverse, with the potential to be
involved in problem identification, negotiation, and public representation. While
involvement may bring about more effective and efficient service, research on electoral
connection and ambition theory can be applied to this context to suggest that interlocal
cooperation might also assist elected officials with personal goals related to achieving
higher office. Given this background on elected officials and interlocal cooperation, the
purpose of this research is to answer the question of what tasks elected officials actually
want to participate in within the cooperative process and begin to understand why they
want to perform these tasks. Six variables based on characteristics of mayors and the
cities they represent will be used to differentiate between types of mayors. In addition,
this research includes a very direct measure of political ambition to help understand
whether electoral goals influence the decision to participate in interlocal cooperation.
The following discussion will detail the study design for this research, including survey
design, variables used and their operationalization, and the statistical methods used to
analyze this data.
a. Survey Design
The primary data source for this research is a four-page mail survey administered
between August and November of 2015. The survey instrument, found in Appendix A,
and accompanying materials were created with the assistance of a variety of sources,
including Dillman (1977) and researcher Eric Zeemering who shared two similar surveys
of public officials in this policy area. The survey was distributed to mayors of cities with a
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population greater than 50,000 residents across a ten-state, southeastern region of the
United States. Alphabetically listed, the states included in the survey are Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Tennessee. As discussed further below, population was used as a filter to
include only those cities that are most likely to be sought after by smaller governments
to assist in interlocal cooperative ventures. The use of larger cities is also especially
fitting for the purpose of evaluating the behavior of elected officials. Given their
experience and visibility as the executive of a large city, these mayors are uniquely
situated to seek higher office. City mayors in this study received an initial survey
mailing, a follow-up postcard one week later, and a new survey and cover letter three
and seven weeks following the initial survey mailing. In total, 64 responses were
received out of a total of 137 surveys sent, a response rate of just over 46 percent. This
response rate exceeds expectations as response rates of surveys of elected officials
are typically low.4
As listed in Table 3-1, the survey instrument asked mayors to rank their “comfort”
level with performing eleven tasks associated with interlocal cooperation. These tasks
were created, in part, by adapting the traditional policy cycle model, attributed to
Lasswell (1951), to the cooperative context. This model is commonly characterized by
five or more stages, typically including problem identification, agenda setting, policy
making, implementation, and evaluation. Additional tasks involving communications with
the public, such as increasing awareness, were included in the survey to reflect political
aspects of cooperation that city mayors could take on. Finally, because interlocal
4

See, for instance, Zeemering (2015) with a response rate of just over 27% or Boyne (1998) for concerns
about low response rates in government contracting research.
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cooperation is a collaborative effort, tasks related to incorporating private and public
partners, as well as delegation of duties to other parties, were included. Mayors ranked
each task on a 1-to-7 scale, from very uncomfortable to very comfortable. The key term
used to investigate elected officials “comfort” does not appear to be typical within public
administration literature. Because this term is atypical within the literature, the following
will discuss the two main reasons why the term is appropriate for this study and will
address potential criticisms.
First, the “comfort” terms allows the research to discover what mayors would
want to do given the opportunity to participate in interlocal cooperation. Employing this
term, a mayor can respond to questions about interlocal cooperation despite a lack of
time in office to participate, such as in the case of a mayor new to his or her office.
Additionally, the comfort term allows mayors to answer questions about interlocal
cooperation despite past experience of having been excluded from the process entirely
or relegated to less preferred tasks by other actors within the process. In other words,
the comfort term allows allows mayors to respond based on preference, not experience.
Second, a measure of comfort, as opposed to “willingness,” allows me to draw a
distinction between what a mayor would desire to do and what a mayor would do out of
a sense of duty to his or her elected position. In other words, it may be the case that
elected officials would perform one or more tasks out of a sense of responsibility to
those he or she serves, such as those related to public representation, but would rather
be involved in other tasks, such as those more technical aspects of cooperation.
Though this distinction draws a fine line between duty and desire, it is an important
distinction because elected officials may perform those tasks which he or she actually
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Table 3-1: Mayoral Tasks Associated with Interlocal Cooperation
Identifying problems that require interlocal cooperation.

Mean (Std. Dev.) 6.39 (0.81)
Median 7
Mode 7
Min. / Max. 4 / 7

Increasing public awareness of interlocal cooperation.

Mean (Std. Dev.) 6.17 (1.03)
Median 6.5
Mode 7
Min. / Max. 3 / 7

Informing and educating public of the nature of the problem and
possible solutions.

Mean (Std. Dev.) 6.28 (0.88)
Median 6.5
Mode 7
Min. / Max. 3 / 7

Networking to incorporate individuals or groups with issue
expertise.

Mean (Std. Dev.) 6.25 (0.93)
Median 6
Mode 7
Min. / Max. 3 / 7
Mean (Std. Dev.) 6.36 (0.90)

Collaborating with other public officials.

Median 7
Mode 7
Min. / Max. 3 / 7
Collaborating with private parties (individual citizens or groups).

Mean (Std. Dev.) 6.27 (0.91)
Median 6.5
Mode 7
Min. / Max. 3 / 7

All tasks measured on a 7-point scale from “Very Comfortable” (7) to “Very Uncomfortable” (1).
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Table 3-1: Mayoral Tasks Associated with Interlocal Cooperation (cont.)
Delegating power to other individuals or groups.

Mean (Std. Dev.) 5.61 (1.39)
Median 6
Mode 7
Min. / Max. 1 / 7

Creating the specific terms of interlocal agreements.

Mean (Std. Dev.) 5.59 (1.24)
Median 6
Mode 7
Min. / Max. 2 / 7

Implementing interlocal agreement activities or programs.

Mean (Std. Dev.) 5.83 (1.05)
Median 6
Mode 6
Min. / Max. 2 / 7

Monitoring of interlocal agreement activities or programs.

Mean (Std. Dev.) 5.67 (1.05)
Median 6
Mode 6
Min. / Max. 3 / 7

Evaluating the long-term success of interlocal cooperation.

Mean (Std. Dev.) 5.91 (1.09)
Median 6
Mode 7
Min. / Max. 3 / 7

All tasks measured on a 7-point scale from “Very Comfortable” (7) to “Very Uncomfortable” (1).

wishes to perform at a more optimal level than to which are performed simply out of
duty.
Taken together, however, these arguments do not make the claim that the
“comfort” term is a perfect measure of task preference. Rather, I maintain that it is an
acceptable measure. The primary criticism of the term is that its meaning may be
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unclear. The mean results of this portion of the survey, reported in Table 3-1, may
support this criticism, as the results for each task skewed toward the positive end of the
comfort continuum. Alternatively, the skewing of responses may have resulted from a
social bias where mayors were unwilling to admit a lack of comfort with any particular
role because doing so would suggest weakness or lack of competence. No matter the
reason for these results, it may be necessary to provide a clear definition of what is
meant by the term in order to strengthen use of the “comfort.”
b. Variables
Beyond identifying mayoral comfort for certain tasks within the cooperative process, the
goal of this research is to examine how preferences differ based on certain
characteristics of mayors and the cities that they represent. The variables to be
examined in this research include length of term in office, city size, racial homogeneity,
city type, interest in running for higher office, and value preference between financial
concerns and service quality. These variables were chosen for a variety of reasons.
First, as described in the paragraphs below, each variable has strong theoretical
significance to studies of interlocal cooperation and more broadly to studies of local
government service provision. Many of the variables chosen in this study also have
been commonly used in studies of ILC, as evidenced by a meta-analysis of studies on
this topic conducted by Bel and Warner (2013), lending academic support to the
relevance of their use. Finally, the variables chosen in this survey were done so for
practical purposes. Data for the variables chosen in this survey were less burdensome
to obtain because they were gathered through the survey instrument or through publicly
available sources such as the U.S. Census and other governmental websites. This
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study is by no means an exhaustive study of variables that could impact mayors and
their involvement with ILC, but other variables, especially those related to local fiscal
stress, are much more difficult to gather given limited resources.
The following variables about mayors and their cities have been chosen for
inclusion in this study: length of term, administrative structure of the city, population
size, and racial homogeneity of the population. Two additional terms were added that
are unique to this study: interest in running for higher office, and a dichotomous variable
that accounts for mayoral concern for either finances or service quality when dealing
with cooperative efforts. The primary function of each variable incorporated into this
study is examine their relationship with the mayoral comfort level of tasks associated
with the interlocal cooperation process. The following discussion will describe why each
variable is appropriate for this research.
i. Length of Term in Office
The length of term in office—that is, how long a mayor has held his or her position—is
important in policy studies generally because greater time in office provides elected
officials with more opportunities to develop expertise in both policy and policymaking
(Hamm and Moncrief 2004; Nice 1994). Greater time in office also allows elected
officials to deliberate on policy matters longer in order to come up with the best means
of achieving their policy goals (DeSoto, Tajalli, and Opheim 2006) and may have the
effect of shifting policy priorities from short-term to long-term concerns. Within the
interlocal cooperation context, longer terms in office also provide elected officials a
greater opportunity to develop political networks with other elected officials that could be
beneficial to cooperation.
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As can be seen in Table 3-2 below, of the 64 respondents to the survey, the
mean or average number of years spent in office is just over seven (7) years, with a
range of zero (0) to twenty-four (24) years in office. Twelve (12) respondent mayors, or
18.75% of respondents, had been in office for a year or less. In fact, one (1) year in
office was the mode, or most reported term, of this data. Based on these responses
alone, nearly 1 out of 5 mayors surveyed would have had very little opportunity to work
in the ILC context as a mayor, though previous experience in either the public or private
sector was not examined in this study.
With regard to the 11 tasks presented in the survey instrument, I would anticipate
that greater length of term in office would be most closely correlated with comfort with
more technical tasks such as creation of terms of interlocal cooperation,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation, and less closely correlated with the more
public communication tasks such as increasing awareness and education. The reasons
for this are two-fold: First, greater expertise through longer terms should provide mayors
with a higher comfort level with technical tasks. A more seasoned mayor may have
more opportunities to work with public administrators and in a regional policymaking

Table 3-2: Descriptive Statistics for Length of Term in Office (in Years)
Mean 7.09
Standard Deviation 6.37
Median 5
Mode 1
Minimum 0
Maximum 24
N = 64
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context. Second, mayors who have served longer terms should have more secure
electoral support, so building relationships with constituents through public
communication tasks may no longer be necessary.
ii. Administrative Structure & City Size (Population)
Shifting to characteristics of the city that mayors represent, two of the more commonly
used variables that could have an impact on comfort with interlocal cooperation are
administrative structure and city population size. For many of the reasons discussed in
the opening to this chapter, including the longer tenure of city managers and their ability
to see long-term policy needs, council-manager cities should provide an atmosphere
more conducive to regional cooperation than is found in mayor-council cities
(Frederickson 1999; Wood 2006). 5
City size is also important in joint cooperation due to the degree of resources and
alternative partners available in larger cities. Andersen and Pierre (2010) refer to larger
cities in the interlocal cooperation context as “hubs” for partnership. Regional hubs may
command more resources than their neighbors and “tend to have more developed
networks with key players outside the region and hence perform a brokerage function
more efficiently than would any of the smaller the partners” (229). They caution,
however, that larger cities can be subject to accusations of power exploitation from their
partners. Though all of the cities in this study would be considered “large” with a
population of over 50,000 residents, the range of participant cities in this study starts at

5

According to the most recent ICMA Municipal Form of Government Survey of 2011, there are two
primary forms of local government present in the United States: council-manager, representing 59% of
reporting municipalities, and mayor-council, representing 33% of reporting municipalities.
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this base level and extends to just over 750,000 citizens. For a breakdown in the
population of participating cities, see Table 3-3 below.
Table 3-3: Frequency of Respondents by City Size (Population)
500,000 or greater 3 (4.7%)
400,000 - 499,000 1 (1.6%)
300,000 - 399,999 0 (0.0%)
200,000 - 299,999 5 (7.8%)
100,000 - 199,999 14 (21.9%)
Under 100,000 41 (64.1%)
N = 64, Average Population = 130,620

iii. Racial Homogeneity
Race is one of the more commonly used demographic characteristics employed in
studies of interlocal cooperation. In terms of service delivery generally, Hefetz and
Warner (2004) note that “heterogeneous populations in large cities may make service
delivery more complex and harder to monitor.” Racial homogeneity is typically
measured as the proportion of the non-Hispanic white population within the total
population (Feiock, Steinacker, and Park 2009, Kwon and Feiock 2010). The same
measure was used in this study using data from the 2009-2013 American Community
Survey 5-Year Estimates for race. Descriptive data for racial homogeneity of
respondents cities in this study can be found in Table 3-4 below. Racial homogeneity is
important to interlocal agreements, both between communities and within a single
community. Between communities, racially homogenous populations are likely to have
uniform preferences (Marando 1968; Zeemering 2009). Two or more communities
sharing similar racial identities, therefore, should have an easier time finding common
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Table 3-4: Racial Homogeneity (Proportion of Non-Hispanic White Population)
90-100% 4 (6.3%)
80-89% 8 (12.5%)
70-79% 19 (29.6%)
60-69% 14 (21.9%)
50-59% 10 (15.6%)
40-49% 3 (4.7%)
Less than 40% 6 (9.4%)
N = 64

ground on service-sharing agreements. Greater racial heterogeneity between
communities, on the other hand, could produce political and economic power
asymmetries that might provide advantages for one or more of the parties to an
interlocal agreement (Feiock 2007). 6 Where power asymmetries exist, dominant parties
may refuse to come to an agreement with others unless they receive most or all of the
benefits of the agreement. Interestingly, however, in a study of interlocal agreements in
Florida, Andrew (2010) finds that communities that are predominantly white generally
prefer to enter into agreements with nonwhite communities.
Within a single community, greater racial homogeneity reduces agency costs for
representative officials. It should be more difficult to ascertain or aggregate a single
community sentiment within a racially heterogeneous community (Feiock 2007). LeRoux
and Carr (2007) note that where racial diversity is greater, public officials may be more
likely to rely on a direct provision of services than interlocal agreements due to the

6

In a study that deviates from the common understanding of the relationship between race and
cooperation, Andersen and Pierre (2010) present evidence from Norway where heterogeneity is far less
of a defining factor in cooperative agreements than how political units define their role within regional
governance.
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difficulty of accommodating a diversity of preferences. In addition, it should be more
difficult to hold a representative accountable for his or her decisions when negotiating
on the behalf of a racially diverse community (Feiock 2007). The local public official
within a racially homogenous community is able to “speak with one voice” in making
decisions for his or her jurisdiction (Oakerson 2004).
Based on the prior research, it might be assumed that a city mayor from a city
with greater racial heterogeneity would be less comfortable engaging in
communications with the public about possible solutions to a local problem for fear of
alienating a segment of the population. Instead, a mayor may prefer more technical
aspects of policymaking or even those tasks which encourage participation among
parties outside of his or her own government. By bringing more parties to the table, a
mayor may be able to more easily deflect blame should a program produce
unsuccessful results.
iv. Interest in Higher Office
One of the unique areas of inquiry within this research is the examination of
interest in higher office and whether it has any relationship to tasks performed within the
interlocal cooperation process. As noted previously, there are a number of other
contexts where electoral ambition is thought to influence behavior, and this research
seeks to examine this factor within the ILC context. In order to gather data on mayoral
interest in higher office, the question “How likely would you be to consider running for a
higher office (e.g., governor, member of Congress) at some point in your political
career?” was included in the survey instrument. Table 3-5 below provides descriptive
data for the responses to this question. The mean response to the question about
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Table 3-5: Interest in Higher Office
Mean 2.45
Standard Deviation 1.10
Mode 3
Median 2
Maximum 5
Minimum 1
N = 64; Responses range from “Extremely Likely” (5) to “Extremely Unlikely” (1)

interest in higher office was 2.45 out of 5, which falls between “Neutral” (3) and
“Unlikely” (2).
v. Value Preference
In a discussion of future research to be conducted concerning elected officials and
interlocal cooperation, Zeemering (2008) notes that, “we must clarify officials’ interests
in the financial implications of interlocal cooperation, in comparison to their service
quality interests” (738). In an attempt to follow this directive, my survey instrument
included a list of five values to be maximized when entering into a shared contract
service agreement. The values listed included equality of citizen access to service,
financial implications of the agreement, citizen engagement in formation, service quality,
and political career interests. The respondent was tasked with placing these values in
order from most to least importance, based on a 5 to 1 scale respectively. The results of
this portion of the survey can be viewed below in Table 3-6. The value most preferred by
mayors was service quality (4.25), followed by the financial implications of the
agreement (4.02), equality of citizen access (3.34), and citizen engagement in formation
(2.34). The least preferred value found in responses was political career interests
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(1.05). As with other politically-oriented aspects of this study, the low ranking of political
career interests may reflect a lack of willingness on the part of elected officials to admit
their own interest in personal gain due to a perceived lack of social acceptance for such
responses.
For the purposes of statistical analysis correlating value preference, between
financial interests and service quality, and the tasks of mayors within the ILC process, I
created a dichotomous variable based on responses to this set of questions. The value
preference variable was created by assigning a zero (0) to those responses where
service quality was prioritized, and a one (1) for those responses where financial
implications of the agreement were favored. Despite the average ranking of each,
twenty-six (26) mayors favored service quality, while thirty-five (35) favored financial
implications of the agreement.

Table 3-6: Value Preference
Value Option

Mean
(Std. Dev.)

Equality of Citizen Access

3.34
(0.73)

Financial Implications of the Agreement

4.02
(1.03)

Citizen Engagement in Formation

2.34
(0.76)

Service Quality

4.25
(0.92)

Political Career Interests

1.05
(0.29)

N = 59 (Reflects responses where all five values options were given a rank value.)

80

c. Methods
For the discrete variables in this study, length of term (or years in office),
population size, racial homogeneity, and interest in higher office, Spearman’s rank-order
correlation (or Spearman’s rho) analysis was performed to assess the relationship
between these variables and mayoral comfort with each interlocal cooperation task
evaluated in this study. An assumption of Spearman’s rho is a monotonic relationship
between variables. A monotonic relationship occurs when, as an increase or decrease
in the value of one variable occurs, so too does that same positive or negative change
occur in the value of the other variable. A monotonic relationship is less demanding than
a linear relationship in that a linear relationship can be modeled with a straight line
whereas a monotonic relationship does not necessarily have to conform to a straight
line model. Prior to performing a correlation test, it is necessary to look at a scatterplot
of the variables to determine the most appropriate method to employ. It would be ideal
to use a Pearson product-moment correlation which requires a linear relationship, but
the presence of a monotonic, non-linear relationship requires Spearman’s rho to be
used instead. Evaluating a scatterplot is important because the Spearman’s rho test can
indicate a monotonic relationship despite the data displaying a non-monotonic
relationship, such as a U-shape. A scatterplot can also reveal outliers that might
increase or decrease the size of the correlation coefficient.
Spearman’s rank-order correlation produces both a correlation coefficient (rs) and
a significance level (p). The correlation coefficient determines the strength of the
relationship being evaluated. Though there is no one agreed upon set of rules for
assigning strength to an association, it is important to consider 1) that correlation
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strengths for research within the social sciences tend to be lower than those found
within the natural sciences and 2) that coefficients produced by Spearman’s rho tend to
be smaller than those produced by Pearson correlation coefficients. The significance
level produced by Spearman’s rho determines whether the correlation coefficient is
statistically significantly different than zero. Finally, Spearman’s rho is a measure of
correlation, not causation. While the presence of an association is noteworthy, further
information would be required in order to make a statement of causation. That being
noted, the findings section of this research will include an analysis of the statistically
significant relationships found between variables and speculate as to why these
relationships exist, which may include causal language. Again, the reader should be
cautioned that correlation results are not causation and further cautioned that the limited
scope of this study, 64 city mayors over a ten-state area, does not necessarily mean
that the results are representative of the much larger, national population of mayors.
For the dichotomous variables in this study, administrative structure and value
preference, the Mann-Whitney U test was performed. The Mann-Whitney U Test
compares the differences between two independent groups where the dependent
variable, the various task rankings in this case, is not normally distributed. The MannWhitney U Test has four basic assumptions that must be met. First, there is one
dependent variable that is either continuous or ordinal. In this study, the variables that
meet this assumption are the mayoral tasks associated with interlocal cooperation as a
continuous variable measured along a seven-point scale. Second, there is one
independent variable that consists of two categorical, independent groups. In this study
there are two dichotomous variables that fit this assumption, city type and value
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preference. Third, there is independence of observations, meaning that no participant
falls into more than one group, for instance, both mayor-council and council-manager
cities. Finally, as will be elaborated on in the findings section, the distribution of scores
for the independent variables affects how the results of the Mann-Whitney U Test will be
interpreted.
III. Findings
The intent of this research is to examine city mayors and their preferred activities within
the context of interlocal cooperation. Specifically, this research asks mayors to rank their
own comfort level with performing certain tasks within this process. Of the variables
examined through both Spearman’s rank order correlation (findings detailed in Table 3-7
below) and the Mann-U Whitney test (findings detailed in Table 3-8 below), the variables
of city size in terms of population, racial homogeneity, city type, and a preference for the
financial concerns of interlocal agreement displayed varying levels of statistical
significance for different tasks, while the remaining variables of years in office as mayor
and interest in running for higher office did not display a statistically significant
relationship for any task evaluated in this study. The following sections will detail the
findings of this survey and attempt to provide explanations for why mayors responded in
the manner that they did.
a. City Size (Population)
The second column of variables in Table 3-7 below reports the results of Spearman’s
rank-order correlations to determine the relationship between city population size and
each of the interlocal cooperation tasks examined in this research. As highlighted in
bold within the table, there is a statistically significant relationship between city size and
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Table 3-7: Spearman’s Rho Correlations of Explanatory Variables and Interlocal Cooperation
Tasks

Term Length
(Years)
Corr.
Coefficient
(Sig., 2-tailed)

City Size
(Population)
Corr.
Coefficient
(Sig., 2-tailed)

Racial
Homogeneity
Corr.
Coefficient
(Sig., 2-tailed)

Interest in
Higher Office
Corr.
Coefficient
(Sig., 2-tailed)

Identifying problems that
require interlocal
cooperation.

-0.010
(0.940)

0.012
(0.925)

-0.138
(0.278)

0.025
(0.847)

Increasing public awareness
of interlocal cooperation.

-0.071
(0.576)

0.136
(0.285)

-0.121
(0.340)

0.115
(0.367)

Informing and educating
public of the nature of the
problem and possible
solutions.

-0.157
(0.216)

0.290*
(0.020)

-0.283*
(0.024)

0.135
(0.287)

Networking to incorporate
individuals or groups with
issue expertise.

-0.202
(0.110)

0.330**
(0.008)

-0.225
(0.074)

0.141
(0.267)

Collaborating with other
public officials.

-0.040
(0.751)

0.225
(0.074)

-0.305*
(0.014)

0.240
(0.056)

Collaborating with private
parties (individual citizens or
groups).

0.115
(0.367)

0.258*
(0.040)

-0.298*
(0.017)

0.132
(0.299)

Delegating power to other
individuals or groups.

0.191
(0.131)

0.236
(0.061)

-0.339**
(0.006)

-0.016
(0.903)

Creating the specific terms
of interlocal agreements.

-0.060
(0.638)

0.116
(0.360)

-0.003
(0.983)

0.122
(0.338)

Implementing interlocal
agreement activities or
programs.

-0.094
(0.458)

0.139
(0.273)

-0.148
(0.244)

0.145
(0.251)

Monitoring of interlocal
agreement activities or
programs.

-0.171
(0.176)

0.093
(0.466)

-0.026
(0.837)

0.107
(0.401)

Evaluating the long-term
success of interlocal
cooperation.

-0.014
(0.911)

0.194
(0.125)

-0.077
(0.544)

0.132
(0.299)

N = 64
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**

84

three of the tasks evaluated in this study. For each task with which the correlation with
city size is significant, the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship can be
rejected. Additionally, the correlation coefficient for each of these three statistically
significant task variables is positive, indicating that city size and each task, separately
considered, tend to increase or decrease in value together. The three tasks for which
there is a statistically significant correlation with city size are “Informing and educating
public of the nature of the problem and possible solutions,” “Networking to incorporate
individuals or groups with issue expertise,” and “Collaborating with private parties
(individual citizens or groups).” The first task involves public communications, and the
latter two tasks involve intergovernmental communications. The following will focus on
the findings of each statistically significant task specifically.
First, there is a medium-to-strong, positive correlation between city size and level
of comfort with the task of informing and educating the public (rs = .290, p = .020). This
correlation is significant at a 95 percent confidence level (p = .020; less than 0.05). In
other words, as the size of a city increases, so too does a mayor’s comfort level with
informing and educating the public about interlocal cooperation. On one hand, this
finding could appear to be counter-intuitive because mayors of large cities are more
likely to open a policy to greater criticism by making it more public. On the other hand,
perhaps mayors from larger cities are immune or at least more hardened to policy
criticism and do not fear that its costs will outweigh the potential gains of greater public
awareness. Mayors from larger cities may also sense that they are unable to shield
policy decisions from the public due to greater media and watch-dog presence and
choose to adapt to this political environment by being more comfortable in this role.
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Second, there is a medium-to-strong, positive correlation between city size and
comfort with the task of networking to incorporate expert parties (rs = .330, p = .008).
This correlation is significant at a 99 percent confidence level (p = .008; less than 0.01).
It is worth noting that the correlation coefficient and the confidence level for this
relationship is the greatest among all relationships tested using Spearman’s rho in this
research. What the relationship demonstrates is that mayors from larger cities feel more
comfortable networking to incorporate others with expertise than mayors from small
cities do. This finding was anticipated as larger cities should have more access to policy
experts within their jurisdiction. This finding may also suggest that because they are
often turned to as “hubs” for regional governance, larger cities embrace a leadership
role and attempt to incorporate expert support as much as possible to ensure program
success.
Third, there is a medium-to-strong, positive correlation between city size and
comfort with the task of collaborating with private parties (rs = .258, p = .040). This
correlation is significant at a 95 percent confidence level (p = .040; less than 0.05).
Perhaps what is most interesting about this finding is that the relationship between city
size and the task of collaborating with private parties is significant, while the relationship
between city size and collaborating with other public officials is not, though this task
does approach significance. This finding is anticipated if for no other reason than that
larger cities should have a greater number of private vendors from which to choose than
do smaller, rural jurisdictions. It is unclear, however, how mayors are impacted by the
greater number of private vendors. It is possible that mayors may be more comfortable
with private vendors when there is an excess of vendors to choose from. Alternatively, it
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may be the case that mayors in cities with many private vendors may be unable to form
close connections to any one vendor and may, in fact, be overwhelmed by their number.
b. Racial Homogeneity
The third column of Table 3-7 provides the statistical findings for Spearman’s rho
correlations of racial homogeneity and the mayoral tasks associated with interlocal
cooperation. The findings demonstrate a statistically significant correlation at a 95%
confidence level (p less than 0.05) for informing and educating the public (rs = -.283, p =
.024), collaborating with other public officials (rs = -.305, p = .014), and collaborating
with private parties (rs = -.298, p = .017). Additionally, the findings demonstrate a
statistically significant correlation at a 99% confidence level (p less than 0.01) for
delegating power to other individuals or groups (rs = -.339, p = .006). Interestingly, the
sign for each of these tasks is negative, meaning that as the level of racial homogeneity
rises, the comfort level for each of these tasks tends to decrease.
At first, the negative direction of these findings would seem to contradict previous
research suggesting that racial homogeneity contributes to greater use of interlocal
cooperation. Racially homogenous cities should provide a safer political environment in
which to conduct regional policy, and these cities should be smaller in population size
and more in need of regional assistance. But this study measures mayoral comfort level
of certain tasks which cannot necessarily be equated with the actual use of regional
agreements. In order to provide a clearer understanding of why these findings are
negatively oriented, further research should be conducted with additional explanatory
variables. For instance, perhaps the political divide between races within the same cities
in the southeast is not perceived by mayors as being so drastic that it inhibits regional
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action. Or perhaps there are specific cultural differences between races that make a
difference such that a large African-American minority population and a large Hispanic
minority population should not be treated similarly. Further, racial and other
demographic similarities or differences between mayors and the majority population of
their city may affect mayoral comfort levels.
c. Interest in Running for Higher Office
Though the variable of interest in running for higher office displayed no statistically
significant correlations with any of the tasks of interlocal cooperation, it is worth
discussing the potential inadequacy of this research with regard to this variable. This
research attempted to capture mayoral interest in higher office directly by questioning
mayors about their likelihood to run for higher office in the future. Unfortunately, it is
impossible to know whether mayors were honest in their responses. It seems very
possible that some mayors would be unwilling to admit to an interest in running for
higher office while actively serving as a city mayor. Mayors may have felt uncertain
about sending such information off to an unknown source with the possibility that such
information would be published without their consent, despite disclaimers informing
them that this would not occur. Future research may reveal a better means of assessing
current interest in running for higher office, but this survey question represented a goodfaith attempt at capturing the concept despite its potential drawbacks.
d. City Type
A series of Mann-Whitney U tests were run to determine if there were differences in
mayoral comfort level with tasks associated with the interlocal cooperation process and
city type, either mayor-council or council-manager. Table 3-8 reports the Mann-Whitney
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Table 3-8: Mann-Whitney U Tests for City Type and Value Preference

City Type
Mann-Whitney U Stat.
z-Score
(Sig., 2-tailed)

Value Preference
Mann-Whitney U Stat.
z-Score
(Sig., 2-tailed)

Identifying problems that require interlocal
cooperation.

459.5
-.040
(.968)

435.0
-.329
(.742)

Increasing public awareness
of interlocal cooperation.

458.0
-.061
(.951)

327.5
-2.023
(.043)

Informing and educating public of the nature
of the problem and possible solutions.

399.5
-.966
(.334)

395.5
-.945
(.345)

Networking to incorporate individuals or
groups with issue expertise.

309.0
-2.361
(.018)

451.5
-.056
(.956)

Collaborating with other public officials.

296.0
-2.642
(.008)

374.0
-1.326
(.185)

Collaborating with private parties (individual
citizens or groups).

336.5
-1.938
(.053)

362.0
-1.483
(.138)

Delegating power to other individuals or
groups.

294.0
-2.461
(.014)

438.0
-.256
(.798)

Creating the specific terms of interlocal
agreements.

457.0
-.073
(.942)

364.0
-1.371
(.170)

Implementing interlocal agreement activities
or programs.

451.5
-.155
(.876)

449.0
-.092
(.927)

Monitoring of interlocal agreement activities or
programs.

456.0
-.088
(.930)

326.5
-1.950
(.051)

Evaluating the long-term success of interlocal
cooperation.

382.0
-1.185
(.236)

452.5
-.038
(.970)

N = 64
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**
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N = 59

U statistic, the standardized test statistic or z-score, and the approximate asymptotic pvalue or significance level for each of these tests. Distributions for mayor comfort levels
along all tasks were similar between city types, as assessed by visual inspection.
Between the two types of cities, median comfort level scores were not statistically
significant for problem identification (U = 459.5, z = -.040, p = .968), increasing public
awareness (U = 458.0, z = -.061, p = .951), educating and informing the public (U =
399.5, z = -.0.966, p = .334), collaborating with private parties (U = 336.5, z = -1.938, p
= .053), creating specific terms of the contract (U = 457.0, z = -.073, p = .942),
implementation (U = 451.5, z = -.155, p = .876), monitoring (U = 456.0, z = -.088, p = .
930), and evaluating program success (U = 382.0, z = -1.185, p = .236).
Median comfort level scores, however, were statistically significant for networking
(U = 309.0, z = -2.361, p = .018), collaborating with other public officials (U = 296.0, z =
-2.642, p = .008), and delegating power (U = 294.0, z = -2.461, p = .014). For each of
these tasks, the median for mayor-council was a 7, the highest level of comfort, while
the median for council-manager was a 6. While both scores represent very high levels
of comfort with these tasks, the statistically significant differences present here may
have more to say about council-manager mayors than their counterparts. Councilmanager mayors appear to more inclusive and less willing to cede their power than
mayor-council mayors. Perhaps these findings indicate that, despite their title, councilmanager mayors feel a lesser sense of authority to engage in networked governance
given the presence of a professional public manager. Again, council-manger mayors
report a high level of comfort for these tasks, but it is their lack of absolute comfort,
especially given a series of questions where the mean responses were all high, that is
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noteworthy.
e. Value Preference
As with the variable for city type, a series of Mann-Whitney U tests were run to
determine if there were differences in mayoral comfort level with tasks associated with
the interlocal cooperation process and mayoral preference for maximizing values
related to either financial implications or service quality when entering into a shared
services contract agreement with other local governments. Again, visual inspections
were used to determine that distributions for mayor comfort levels along all tasks were
similar between these value types. As detailed in Table 3-8, the only statistically
significant median score among these tasks and value preference was found in
increasing public awareness (U = 582.5, z = 2.023, p = .043). For this value, the median
score for service quality was a 6, while the median score for financial implications was a
7. As with the findings on city type, both of these medians represent higher comfort level
scores. But the statistically significant relationship present in this task may indicate that
mayors who are primarily concerned with financial implications over service quality
possess a higher sense of duty to their constituents, based on their need to save
taxpayer dollars and to keep constituents informed of problems. While constituents still
feel the effects of service quality, mayors may recognize that they cannot please all of
their constituents all of the time. In other words, mayors may recognize that the public
takes a varying, subjective stance toward service quality, but when it comes to public
finances, the public is more objective or unified in their position.
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IV. Conclusion
When examining city mayors and the tasks that they might like to perform in the
interlocal cooperation process, there remains the all-important question of why mayors
might want to perform certain tasks. In part, this research has attempted to answer this
question by introducing factors related to the city itself and the mayor and his or her own
experience and preferences. Certainly, there may be other factors that have not been
included in this analysis including age, gender, prior work experience, and educational
discipline that might have some bearing on mayoral decision-making. In addition, this
research did not address reasons why mayors would not want to be involved in
interlocal cooperation or the tasks associated with this form of policy. While questions
concerning a lack of willingness to participate in interlocal cooperation were left out of
the survey instrument for practical reasons, such an examination would be warranted in
future research as it would help to paint a clearer picture of mayoral attitudes.
A final aspect of this research that is worth examining is a series of questions
within the survey examining the support of certain role statements in interlocal politics.
These six role statements are replicated from the work of Zeemering (2015), which
presents the results of a mail survey of San Francisco Bay Area mayors and city council
members between November 2011 and January 2012. Zeemering created these roles
based on previous literature in interlocal cooperation. For instance, the statements in
which elected officials advocate for their jurisdiction or its employees is “consistent with
the claim that elected officials can help anchor new governance arrangements to
traditional political jurisdiction” (6). An additional role draws a contrast between the role
of advocating for one’s own jurisdiction with a more collectively-minded role of seeking
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Table 3-9: Descriptive Statistics of Support for Roles in Interlocal Politics
Adkins (2016)
(n = 61)

Zeemering (2015)
(n = 153)

Role Statement
Mean
(Std. Dev.)

Mean
(Std. Dev.)

I promote the interests of my city when talking with other
local governments about sharing or contracting services.

5.70
(1.31)

5.88
(1.36)

I attempt to find solutions that will equally benefit my city
and the other local governments with whom we work.

5.89
(1.07)

6.11
(1.10)

I protect my city from becoming too dependent on
contracts and service sharing arrangements with other
local governments.

4.57
(1.66)

4.36
(1.93)

I advocate for the interests of my city’s government
employees during any discussions about sharing or
contracting services.

5.38
(1.28)

5.15
(1.50)

Protecting the identity of my community is a priority when
making decisions about local government services.

5.61
(1.54)

5.13
(1.83)

Forming working relationships with other local
governments is beneficial to my political career.

5.00
(1.72)

4.60
(1.89)

equal benefits for all governments involved in an agreement. In addition, the roles
pertaining to protection of community identity and dependence on agreements with
other governments reflect common barriers to entry into interlocal agreements. Finally,
the last role that mayors are asked to rank relates to obtaining political career benefits
of involvement with interlocal agreements.
To evaluate these roles, city mayors were asked to rank their comfort with each
along a 7-point scale. Table 3-9 below presents the role statements, the mean, and
standard deviation scores for both this study and Zeemering’s research. Interestingly,
both studies produced very similar results in terms of mean scores and how those
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means rank against one another. In fact, the only difference between this research and
Zeemering is that the position of protecting local identity and promoting government
employees is flipped between the third and fourth positions. For both studies, the role
with the highest mean was seeking equal benefits for all governments involved. While
constituents may instead want their mayor to seek the highest possible benefit for their
own jurisdiction, this more regionally balanced preference for benefits may bode well for
the long-term viability of ILC service delivery.
The lowest ranked role in both studies was protection against becoming too
dependent on contracts and service sharing arrangements with other governments. The
low ranking for this role may reflect a common mayoral understanding that service
sharing agreements are the new normal when it comes to service delivery and that
between becoming too dependent on other local governments and becoming dependent
to private partners, the former is the lesser of the two evils. If this is the case, it is once
again an encouraging picture of mayoral governance as it displays a recognition of
service delivery needs and available options. It is also worth noting that, in both studies,
forming working relationships that are beneficial to one’s political career finishes just
ahead of becoming too dependent on other governments. In other words, the possibility
of personal gain appears to provide more of a justification for entering into an interlocal
agreement than the fear of dependence serves as a barrier. Still, in both this study and
Zeemering, protection from becoming too dependent on other governments scores
positively (with 4.57 and 4.36 respectively, each just above the median of 4.00), which
seems to reveal that elected officials are not without some concern for this possibility.
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Chapter 4: Political Communications and Interlocal Cooperation
For many, the term “political communications” may bring to mind images of campaign
ads, especially those involving mud-slinging attacks on political opponents. Negativity in
communications with the public during campaigns pervades elections at all levels of
government, even races for mayor. On September 9, 2015, for example, the New York
Times ran an article titled “In Mayoral Race, Nashville Politics Forgets Its Manners,”
detailing the contentious race between candidates David Fox and Megan Barry
(Fausset 2015). On one side, a series of radio ads by Fox and his supporters had
accused Barry of opposing prayer before high school football games and neglecting to
say “under God” when reciting the pledge of allegiance. On the other side, ads run by
the Tennessee Democratic Party claimed that as mayor, Fox would “move Nashville
back to the segregated 1950s.” Though both Democrats, Fox enjoyed support from
members of both parties (Garrison 2015). The combined support, however, was not
enough in the end to overcome Barry who won by a decisive ten percentage points in a
run-off election.
But the role of city mayor as a communicator with the public, as well as within
government, does not end upon taking office. Though pre-election communication may
be filled with negativity, post-election communication may need to shift its focus toward
more productive ends that bring people together rather than divide them. Grady,
Rothman, Smith, and Balch-Gonzalez (2007) provide the example of former Denver
mayor, and eventual governor of Colorado, Tim Hickenlooper and his role as
communicator to bring about positive change in schools. According to the authors,
mayoral communications are important because mayors hold a “unique position to
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mobilize a community’s diverse stakeholders” through the visibility and authority of their
office (3). The authors even quote Hickenlooper as stating, “A lot of what the mayor’s
office can do is keep communicating different aspects of the challenge [of improving
public schools]” (12).
The following chapter examines political communications, not from the
perspective of elections and negative campaign ads, but in a more productive sense to
understand more about how mayors use communication in the context of interlocal
cooperation. Specifically, this chapter examines the following three questions related to
political communications with the public and within government:
1. How often do city mayors talk with other government officials, and when they
do, do they discuss interlocal cooperation?
2. How does past experience with citizens and citizen groups relate to
willingness to participate in communications activities in the interlocal
cooperation policy process?
3. Which forums for communication with the public have mayors used in the
past during the interlocal cooperation process, and which forums would they
like to use in the future?
Each question will be addressed individually with a brief literature review, an explanation
of the methods used, and a number of questions that could be pursued in future
research. Taken together, these questions are important to examine because political
communications are so vital to networked governance. Given the scope and complexity
of issues facing local government, it is arguably the case that modern mayors do not
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have the luxury of sheltering themselves from their neighbors if they want to achieve
meaningful policy while in office.
I. Communications with Other Public Officials
The first question addressed in my review of political communications concerns contact
between mayors and representatives from other governments. Specifically, this
research asks the questions: how often do city mayors talk with other government
officials, and when they do, do they discuss interlocal cooperation? The following will
briefly discuss why these questions are important to study through a discussion of
relevant literature, a description of how these research questions are answered through
the survey instrument, an explanation of the key findings, and some possible avenues
through which future research might be directed.
Perhaps the most important reason to study mayoral communications with other
public officials is that better communication between parties to an agreement can help
to overcome many of the challenges that are unique to cooperative efforts. One source
of difficulty in collaboration is the “social dilemma,” which Voogd (2001) defines as “a
conflict between the choice the individual would make to maximise his or her self
interest and the choice that would be best for the group” (80). Voogd notes that in order
to prevent the ills of this kind of self-interested behavior, “individuals have to restrain
themselves” but that this is “not an easy affair” (80). But in the absence of restraint,
what options are available? In her review of cooperation literature, Ostrom (1998) states
that one of the ways to limit the possibility of social dilemmas that threaten cooperation
is through face-to-face communication between parties. Ostrom states that, “consistent,
strong, and replicable findings are that substantial increases in the levels of coordination
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are achieved when individuals are allowed to communicate face to face” (6). There are
a number of reasons for the efficacy of face-to-face communication, but Ostrom
concludes that “exchanging mutual commitment, increasing trust, creating and
reinforcing norms, and developing a group identity” appear to be the most important.
Trust built through communication in social or interpersonal networks is often
regarded as necessary to initiate and maintain cooperative agreements (Thurmaier and
Wood 2002; Wood 2006). In the context of collaborative watershed planning, Bentrup
(2001) notes that face-to-face interaction helps to reduce stereotypes and establish trust
among stakeholders. There are a number of institutional structures that allow for
repeated, face-to-face communication. Councils of government and other types of
regional planning organizations, for instance, allow for this kind of interaction and are
often cited as an important social networks from which interlocal cooperation might arise
(Feiock 2007; Lackey, Freshwater, and Rupasingha 2002). As noted by LeRoux (2008),
“when two jurisdictions share ties as members of a regional planning organization, their
likelihood of becoming tied on another dimension (e.g., as parties to an interlocal
service agreement) is substantially increased” (161). Evidence of the importance of
social networks to cooperation is also found in LeRoux, Brandenburg, and Pandey
(2010) who study of 919 municipal managers and department heads across the United
States. The authors find that interlocal service cooperation increases when government
officials frequently engage in network activities such as participation in a regional
association or council of government.7 While this study does not question mayors about

LeRoux, Brandenburg, and Pandey (2010) also find that interlocal service cooperation increases when
officials are united by shared professional norms and values as imparted to them by academic
institutions, specifically through the acquisition of an MPA degree.
7
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their preferred mode of communication in the cooperative context, research suggests
that face-to-face communication within one of these social networks is likely to have
served as at least a starting point for interlocal discussions.
Again, it must be stressed that the key to successful interlocal cooperation is not
the form of communication but the trust that it can build. In fact, face-to-face
communication is not always necessary for shared services, as conflict over values and
objectives may be low from the outset (Emerson, Nabatchi, Balogh 2012). In a report
targeted to county managers, Zeemering and Delabbio (2013) repeatedly stress the
need for trust between parties to a shared services arrangement. In order to achieve
this goal, the authors recommend transparent and continuous communications,
resisting the urge to “set relationships on autopilot” (6). LeRoux and Carr (2005) refer to
the norms of trust and reciprocity as “principal among the social factors” (15) involved in
cooperation and that parties desire to bring these norms about in order to achieve
individual and collective gains. Attempting to build these trusted relationships in the
midst of a collaborative project is often referred to as “social capital,” which Lin (2001)
defines as “investment in social relations with expected returns” (6). For example, one
community might come to the aid of another in a time of emergency, even where no
formal agreement is in place, in the hope that the favor may be returned one day
(LeRoux and Carr 2005). Whether building trust is ultimately done for the good of the
region or a single jurisdiction, or even just for individual gain, research seems to indicate
that it will increase the likelihood of project success.
Beyond laying a groundwork of trust, there a number of more functional reasons
why communication between public officials is important for successful collaboration.
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Feiock (2008) notes that communication is necessary to exchange information about
preferences and resources. This process, however, becomes more difficult as the
number and distance between parties is greater. Even where information is successfully
conveyed, communication must be open and clear so that interpretations of shared
information are the same among parties (Margerum 2011). Communication between
parties is also important from the outset of collaborative discussions in order to
successfully negotiate the tasks that are to completed either jointly or individually by
parties (Carr and Hawkins 2013). Frequency of communication and accumulated trust
over time may shorten the negotiation process of dividing responsibilities and benefits
that might otherwise prove costly and destructive to an agreement (Kwon and Feiock
2010). So great is the barrier that negotiation poses to forming an agreement, that Carr,
Gerber, and Lupher (2007) suggest that states should take steps to facilitate
cooperation such as standardizing financial reporting for local governments so that
parties begin discussions with a more common understanding of the cooperative
environment.
a. Communication with Other Public Officials - Descriptive Findings
Given the theoretical benefits (exchanging mutual commitment, building trust) and more
functional benefits (exchanging information, negotiating terms) that might be realized
within the cooperative context from a history of frequent communication between public
officials, the following section examines what city mayors have reported about their own
experience. Descriptive data about the frequency of mayoral communications with other
public officials was gathered from a survey of mayors from cities with a population of
greater than 50,000 residents in 10 southeastern states. The questions concerning
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communications were derived, in part, from a similar survey conducted by Eric
Zeemering on elected officials’ opinions about sharing local government services. For
this research, the questions differ from those used by Zeemering in that the question,
“How frequently do you talk with elected officials from other cities or from the county
government?” was broken into three questions evaluating communication with officials
from other cities, a mayor’s own county government, and other county governments
separately. The separation of these questions allows for a more detailed understanding
of mayoral communication patterns.
Survey responses to questions concerning communication with other public
officials were based on a 5-point scale ranging from “Never” (1), “A few times each year”
(2), “Once per month” (3), “A few times each month” (4), to “At least once per week” (5).
The mean scores for responses to these questions, found in Table 4-1 below, reveal
that city mayors speak most frequently with officials from other cities (Mean = 4.125),
followed closely by elected officials from the mayor’s own county (Mean = 4.032). These
mean scores occur around a score of 4, meaning that communication occurs “A few
times each month.” In a distant third is communication with elected officials from other
counties (Mean = 2.968), scoring just below a 3 or “Once per month.” Considering the
multitude of obligations before mayors of large cities, both functional and ceremonial,
the high frequency with which mayors report discussing cooperation with other city
officials may suggest that mayors place a high level of importance in regional concerns.
Alternatively, these findings may just show that mayors are mandated into attending a
council of government or other regional meeting of public officials. The high frequency
of discussions with officials in one’s own county, however, may not be directly
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Table 4-1: Descriptive Statistics on Discussion with Other Public Officials
Mean *
(Std. Dev.)
How frequently do you talk with elected officials from other cities?

4.125
(0.917)

How frequently do you talk with elected officials from your county?

4.032
(0.897)

How frequently do you talk with elected officials from other county
governments?

2.968
(1.092)

How frequently do you attend meetings with elected officials from outside
of your own city government?

3.143
(0.981)

Within the last 12 months, has your city discussed contracting with another
city or county government to provide a service that you have traditionally
provided on your own?

Yes = 38 (63.3%)
No = 22 (36.7%)

* Measured on a 5-point scale from “At Least Once Per Week” (5) to “Never” (1).

attributable to a concern for regional issues, as there will always be some jurisdictional
overlap between city and county governments.
A fourth question concerning the frequency of attending meetings with elected
officials from outside of one’s own city government was included on the survey. As
noted above in the literature review, councils of government and other regional planning
associations provide an opportunity for face-to-face interaction that can be beneficial to
cooperative agreements, even if regional cooperation is not the primary function of the
meeting. Mayor responses averaged a score of just over 3 (Mean = 3.143), or “Once
per month” for meetings.
The final question in this section, and one which directly addresses interlocal
cooperation, is a yes-or-no question about whether the mayor has discussed
contracting to provide a service traditionally provided in-house with officials from outside
of their own government within the last twelve months. Of the 60 usable responses, 38
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(63.3%) report having discussed service cooperation in the last year, while 22 (36.7%)
had not. The important contrast to be drawn from this chart is that while both
administrative structures display a positive preference for having discussed cooperation,
there is a stronger bias toward discussion among mayor-council governments. This
finding is to be expected because the primary executive office of the mayor-council form
is the mayor, whereas the city manager enjoys this role in the council-manager form. In
the mayor-council form, the mayor should be expected, therefore, to have more
opportunities to engage in meaningful policy discussions.
With nearly two-thirds of mayors responding that they had discussed contracting,
this finding shows that at the very least that mayors are aware of this provision option.
This finding may also be conservative as some respondents to the survey may have
been newer to the office and had lacked an opportunity for this type of discussion.
Alternatively, twelve months is a long time period in the term of a mayor and that more
mayors did not discuss this policy option may be surprising. This finding may also be
exaggerated due to a sort of acquiescence bias where mayors responded that they had
discussed cooperation despite not having done so because 1) to have failed to have
discussed cooperation might portray the mayor in a negative light, and 2) the subject of
the survey concerns cooperation generally.
b. Communication with Other Public Officials - Statistical Findings
While nearly two-thirds of mayors report engaging in cooperative discussions with other
public officials over the previous year, these discussions do not necessarily imply actual
governmental action. In order to refine our understanding of this finding, statistical
methods were employed to examine the relationship of ILC discussions with regard to
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administrative structure. In order to compare the response to discussion of interlocal
cooperation over the last twelve months (yes-or-no) with city type (council-manger or
mayor-council), a chi-square test for association was performed. The chi-square test is
used to determine whether two nominal or dichotomous variables are associated, also
phrased as whether the two variables are statistically independent. Applied to this
research, the chi-squared test will allow us to see if these two types of cities vary in
having discussed interlocal cooperation or not. The relationship between frequency of
communication and city type is worth examining because among mayors, those that
govern in mayor-council cities should be in a better position to act unilaterally to bring
about cooperative action.
Based on the cross-tabulation of the two variables, as reported in Table 4-2
below, mayors from mayor-council cities were considerably more likely to have
discussed interlocal cooperation than to have had a discussion in the last twelve months
(Yes = 17, No = 4), while the count for mayors in council-manager cities was far more
balanced (Yes = 21, No = 18). Based on the results of the chi-square test, there was a
statistically significant association between city type and having discussed interlocal
cooperation in the last twelve months, χ2(1) = 4.319, p = .038. Finally, though chi-square
tests inform us about whether there is an association, they do not inform us about the
strength or magnitude of the association. Phi (φ) is employed as a means of association
for these two dichotomous variables. For this research, there was a moderately strong
association between city size and discussion of interlocal cooperation, φ = -0.268, p = .
038. Though this analysis displays an association between city type and interlocal
cooperation discussion, it is important to remember that other variables may have a
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Table 4-2: Cross-tabulation of City Type and Interlocal Cooperation Discussion
Discussion: Yes

Discussion: No

Total

Type:
Mayor-Council

Count
% within Type
% within Disc.
% of Total

17
81.0%
44.7%
28.3%

4
19.0%
18.2%
6.7%

21
100.0%
35.0%
35.0%

Type:
Council-Manager

Count
% within Type
% within Disc.
% of Total

21
53.8%
55.3%
35.0%

18
46.2%
81.8%
30.0%

39
100.0%
65.0%
65.0%

Total

Count
% within Type
% within Disc.
% of Total

38
63.3%
100.0%
63.3%

22
36.7%
100.0%
36.7%

60
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

Pearson Chi-Square = 4.319, p = 0.038
Phi (φ) = -0.268, p = 0.038

bearing on this association. In the mayor-council category, it may be the case that many
mayors were newly on the job or that there simply had not been a need for these
discussions.
c. Areas for Future Research in Interlocal Communications
There are a number of questions that still remain unanswered in the area of interlocal
communications. LeRoux and Carr (2005) specifically draw attention to the need for
individual-level analyses focusing on communication and interaction patterns of elected
officials and administrative professionals. Unfortunately, knowing only the frequency of
discussions gets at neither the nature nor the reasons for engaging in discussion.
Additionally, a more focused research project could evaluate the frequency as
well as the types of meetings. Such a project could also include questions about the
involvement of private and non-profit organizations in these meetings, whether meetings
are led by a single, dominant party or are more balanced and cooperative, and whether
interlocal agreements arise out of these meetings. The following questions could also
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be asked of interlocal meetings: are these meetings regularly scheduled? Are they
policy specific or more general in nature? Though mayors are asked about talking with
other officials and attending meetings, a fuller understanding of this topic would include
more venue-specific questions. Do mayors discuss interlocal cooperation in a one-onone setting or in a group setting? Are there different types of cooperation that are
discussed more frequently in these different settings? There may also be aspects of the
method of discussion (i.e., in-person, telephone, e-mail, digital meeting) that have
important implications for following through on these discussions to transform talk into
real policy action.
While the question on whether discussions had taken place over the last year
represents a good first step in understanding communication concerning ILC, there are
several lines of inquiry that could be explored in future research. First, this question only
addresses whether discussions had taken place, not whether they had led to actual
governmental action. It might also be useful to know whether a region-based approach
to services that had been discussed with other public officials had also been discussed
separately with private sector vendors. In other words, have other options for this
service had ever been on the table? Finally, this question lacks depth about the nature
of discussions with other officials. There would certainly be a difference between simply
acknowledging that there is a problem that might be solved regionally versus actually
brainstorming measures that might be taken to address the issue. In other words, there
would appear to be a need for questions concerning the depth or extent of these
discussions.
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Finally, another line of inquiry that arises from the descriptive findings of this
research concerns the frequency of attending meetings with other public officials. The
findings of this research indicate that mayors attend these kinds of meetings just over
once per month, possibly suggesting that mayors are only able to be a member of one
regional organization with a monthly meeting at any one time. Future research might
look into mayoral patterns of regional organization membership, or membership in
organizations generally, and the factors that allow or restrain mayors from taking part in
these groups. Time and salience of the group purpose would appear to be logical
factors for analysis but additional factors such as educational background, party
affiliation, or even governance style or personality type, such as an extroverted versus
an introverted nature, would also be interesting variables for inclusion.
II. Past Experience as a Factor in Future Communications
One of the most basic features of interlocal cooperation that may be taken for granted is
the fact that it involves governmental action that extends beyond traditional jurisdictional
borders. Though Briffault (1996) ultimately advocates for a reduction in the significance
of existing local boundaries and the creation of regionally-bounded governments to
address matters of regional significance, he also elaborates on how local borders are
critical to the development of local autonomy. One of the primary benefits of borders
that the author mentions is that they limit the number of citizens that a public official
needs to communicate with over matters of policy. For public officials, less
communication should mean that they experience less stress on their time and patience
than they would experience when governing a larger region. Perhaps more importantly
for the citizen, local borders mean that their share of power and influence over
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government is greater in a more limited region. Thus, when discussing communication
between city mayors and members of the public in the context of region-spanning
interlocal cooperation, I believe that it is critical to draw attention to the fact that officials
may feel overburdened while citizens may feel a diminished sense of efficacy.
From a theoretical perspective, studies of how elected officials communicate with
the public in the context of interlocal cooperation, for any purpose, would fit well in the
diverse body of literature that examines public engagement at the local level of
government. Some of the more recent topics covered in this literature include the
following: the use of neighborhood-based organizations versus governmental
organizations to promote engagement (Glaser, Yeager, and Parker 2006), building
greater citizen engagement at the state and local levels of government through
information and communication technologies (Dawes 2008), and the challenge of
incorporating outsiders into the engagement process of community members in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina (Evans-Cowley and Gough 2008).
There are very few instances of literature directly addressing communications by
elected officials in the interlocal cooperation context. LeRoux and Carr (2005), for
instance, offer the suggestion that elected officials may favor cooperation as a means of
policy delivery in order to bring public visibility to a favored political issue, a sort of
indirect method of communicating with the public. Warner (2010) discusses the role of
private approaches to providing public goods. Public goods provided by private clubs,
such as swimming pools, security services, and roads are beneficial in that they
encourage citizen engagement and investment into the production of services. Warner,
however, urges local governments to explore ways to break down barriers that often
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exclude some citizens from enjoying the benefits of these services based on age,
income, and ethnicity. In one of the few studies of interlocal cooperation that directly
mention citizen engagement, Zeemering (2008) notes that, “Collaborative processes
that focus on efficiency without public representation and engagement run the risk of
being sidelined when a mobilized opposition emerges” (737). Zeemering, however, finds
that elected officials are more concerned with providing effective services and that
public administrators should take on the role of informing and educating the public to
clarify program goals and suppress future opposition. The following research findings
attempt to add to this body of literature by addressing how past experience dealing with
the public in the cooperation process has affected mayoral comfort in performing
communication tasks with the public.
a. Communication with the Public - Descriptive Findings
City mayors were first asked four questions about individual citizens and citizen group
involvement in interlocal cooperation. Table 4-3 below details the mean and standard
deviation of responses to these questions. These questions draw a distinction between
individual citizens and citizen groups on one hand and activity and productivity on the
other. Though the terms “active” and “productive” were left to the interpretation of the
respondent, my intent was that the terms would take on a common understanding,
especially when paired together. By “active,” the intended meaning would be defined in
terms of numbers of individuals or groups that participated relative to the population and
to other forms of government activity that allows for citizen involvement. By “productive,”
the intended meaning would be defined in terms of activity that in some manner
improved an aspect of the regional cooperation effort.
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Table 4-3: Descriptive Statistics on Discussion with the Public
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
In your experience, how active are individual citizens in interlocal
cooperation discussions? *

3.000
(0.823)

In your experience, how productive has individual citizen activity been to
interlocal cooperation discussion? **

3.476
(0.895)

In your experience, how active are citizens groups in interlocal cooperation
discussions? *

3.000
(0.741)

In your experience, how productive has citizen group activity been to
interlocal cooperation discussion? **

3.492
(0.821)

* Measured on a 5-point scale from “Always Active” (5) to “Never Active” (1).
** Measured on a 5-point scale from “Very Productive” (5) to “Very Counterproductive” (1).

Based on the experience of the mayor, two questions asked how active individual
citizens and citizen groups are in interlocal cooperation. The possible responses for
these questions ranged from “Always active” (5), “Usually active” (4), “Occasionally
active” (3), “Almost never active” (2), to “Never active” (1). Two additional questions
asked about citizen and citizen group productivity with the same response options
tailored to productivity, from “Always productive” (5) to “Never productive” (1). The
reason for drawing the distinction between individual citizens and citizen groups was to
gauge whether mayors view organized group activity more favorably than they do that
of individual citizens. While the policy area expertise of organized groups may or may
not be greater than that of an individual citizen, what is not in doubt is the power that
groups possess greater power through their numbers. Citizen groups may have greater
access to resources, but even if they do not, their combined voting power may be
enough to persuade elected officials of their right to be heard.
As Table 4-3 demonstrates, responses for individual citizens and citizen groups
were nearly identical along both measure of activity and productivity. In terms of activity,
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individual citizens (with a mean of 3.000) were viewed by mayors as being just as active
as citizen groups (with a mean of 3.000). In terms of productivity, individual citizens (with
a mean of 3.476) were viewed by mayors as being only slightly less active than citizen
groups (with a mean of 3.492). Though these findings do not draw a distinction between
citizen and citizen groups, there is a more clear distinction in terms of activity and
productivity. The higher mean score among both groups in terms of productivity
suggests that while mayors find public involvement in the interlocal cooperation process
to be only occasional, the usefulness or productivity of that activity is fairly high. If this
finding is correct, then elected officials should have an interest finding ways to engage
the public in order to increase their participation in the future.
While the preceding questions examine mayoral impressions of past history with
the public in the cooperative context, there remains the question of with whom mayors
would like to communicate with in the future. Following the questions on citizen and
citizen group activity and productivity, a final question asked mayors about which types
of citizens they would be most interested to work with in future interlocal cooperation
discussions, with five alternatives provided (business leaders, civic leaders, political
party members, legal professionals, and the general public) and a sixth, open-ended
alternative for additional groups to be included. The frequency of responses along with
the percentage of respondents reporting each citizen type is reported in Table 4-4
below. The most frequently reported citizen type for inclusion in interlocal cooperation
discussion is business leaders, appearing in 54 responses, or by 85.71% of mayors.
This is followed by civic leaders with 49 responses (77.78%), the general public with 28
responses (44.44%), and legal professionals with 23 responses (36.51%). Political party
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Table 4-4: Descriptive Statistics on Interest in Citizens to Work within Interlocal Cooperation
Citizen Type

Frequency (%)

Business Leaders

54 (85.71%)

Civic Leaders

49 (77.78%)

Political Party Members

9 (14.29%)

Legal Professionals

23 (36.51%)

General Public

28 (44.44%)

Other

2 (3.17%)

members only appeared in 9 responses (14.29%), and two responses listed “other” as a
preferred citizen type but both responses failed to detail what that additional type might
be.
The fact that business leaders rank highest among preferred citizen groups may
lead us to the conclusion that city mayors are especially concerned about the financial
aspects of interlocal cooperation. Alternatively, mayors may view private sector partners
as trusted parties to include, possibly as a result of prior experience with privatization
measures. It is also possible that responses to this question display a regional and
political bias toward the private sector, as southern states tend to lean more toward the
politically conservative, thus harboring a more favorable attitude toward the private
sector. The low frequency of political party members as preferred parties for inclusion in
interlocal cooperation may reflect the fact that the city mayor is, at least in name, a nonpartisan office. The low frequency of legal professionals as preferred parties may reflect
a number of different political realities. Mayors may independently possess legal
knowledge as current or former attorneys, and each mayor should have access to a city
law director. It may also be the case that mayors simply do not believe that legal
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professionals would possess the kind of expertise that could be useful in a cooperative
effort.
b. Communication with the Public - Statistical Findings
Much of the focus of this research has been involved the comfort level of city mayors in
performing various tasks within the policy process of interlocal cooperation. While many
of the tasks examined in this research are more technical in nature, three of the tasks
(increasing public awareness, informing and educating the public, and networking to
incorporate individuals and groups with issue expertise) are based on mayoral
communications efforts with the public. Taking the very basic principle that past
experience might dictate future behavior, the following section of this research asks the
question of whether past experience with citizens and citizen groups has any correlation
with mayoral comfort in performing communications efforts directed at the public in the
future.
As in the previous chapter, Spearman’s rank correlation test was used to
evaluate correlation between the three public communications tasks and mayoral
experience with citizens and citizen groups. The data produced by these correlation
tests is presented below in Table 4-5. As highlighted in bold in the table, there are three
statistically significant relationships, each involving the communication task related to
“informing and educating the public.” First, there is a medium-to-strong, positive
correlation between this task and the perceived activity level of citizens in the interlocal
cooperation process that is statistically significant at a 95% confidence level (rs = .297, p
= .018). Second, there is a medium-to-strong, positive correlation between this task and
the perceived activity level of citizen groups in the interlocal cooperation process that is
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statistically significant at a 95% confidence level (rs = .271, p = .032). Finally, there is a
medium-to-strong, positive correlation between “informing and educating the public” and
the perceived productivity level of citizen groups in the interlocal cooperation process
that is statistically significant at a 95% confidence level (rs = .312, p = .013).
Based on the findings of these correlations, there are a few observations to be
made. First, while comfort with “informing and educating the public” was positively
correlated with the activity level of citizens, citizen groups, and the productivity of citizen
groups, correlation tests involving “increasing public awareness” showed no statistically
significant relationships. Comparing these two tasks, “increasing public awareness”
would seem to be a less demanding task for mayors to perform than “informing and
educating the public” because the former should be less politically controversial. These
findings may simply confirm this difference because it may be that “increasing public

Table 4-5: Spearman’s Rho Correlations of Public Activity/Productivity and Interlocal Cooperation
Active
Citizens
Corr.
Coefficient
(Sig., 2-tailed)

Productive
Citizens
Corr.
Coefficient
(Sig., 2-tailed)

Active Citizen
Groups
Corr.
Coefficient
(Sig., 2-tailed)

Productive
Citizen
Groups
Corr.
Coefficient
(Sig., 2-tailed)

Increasing public awareness
of interlocal cooperation.

0.121
(0.344)

0.067
(0.599)

0.113
(0.378)

0.225
(0.076)

Informing and educating
public of the nature of the
problem and possible
solutions.

0.297*
(0.018)

0.153
(0.231)

0.271*
(0.032)

0.312*
(0.013)

Networking to incorporate
individuals or groups with
issue expertise.

0.183
(0.150)

0.067
(0.602)

0.160
(0.211)

0.214
(0.093)

Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**
N = 63
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awareness” does not require a history of active and productive citizens or citizen
groups. Alternatively, it may be the case that there simply is no discernible relationship
between these variables without any argument for why this might be the case. The more
demanding task of “informing and educating the public,” however, displays correlations
with citizen or citizen group activity and productivity, perhaps indicating that the public
can provide positive or negative reinforcement to mayors through their actions that
either encourages or discourages more demanding activity.
Like “increasing public awareness,” the variable of “networking to incorporate
experts” displayed no statistically significant relationships with the activity and
productivity of citizens or citizen groups. Compared to the aforementioned tasks, this
task may be even more demanding on mayoral resources, as it requires mayors to
identify experts within a community and may involve selecting some experts while
excluding others. Again, the lack of any statistically significant relationship may simply
imply that there is no discernible relationship between these variables and no reason for
the lack of pattern. Like “increasing public awareness,” it may instead be the case that
mayors are consistent in their need for experts in the cooperation process despite their
history with the public in this context. The lack of statistically significant relationships
may also represent a logical disconnect in the survey instrument itself as mayors may
view their history with the public and the need to incorporate experts as drawing for two
entirely different pools of public input. If this is the case, this correlation is inappropriate
from the outset, but the lack of statistically significant findings within this research
negates the need for further discussion on this point.
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III. Qualitative Research on Public Communication Venue Preference
The final section of this research concerning elected officials and their communications
with the public about regional policymaking is based on two open-ended questions
found on the August 2015 survey of city mayors. The two questions posed to mayors
were:
1) What actions have been taken to involve citizens in interlocal cooperation
discussions, by either you, your office, or any other political actors involved in the
process?
2) What actions would you take in the future, if any, to increase involvement in
interlocal cooperation discussions?
Of the sixty-four (64) surveys returned, forty-seven (47) mayors (68.75%) provided a
response to the first question about past citizen involvement, and forty (40) mayors
(62.50%) provided a response to the second question about future citizen involvement.
A full list of responses to these open-ended questions, with identifying material altered
for the protection of respondent anonymity, has been included in Appendix B.
As noted in this and previous chapters, interlocal cooperation involves an added
dimension of complexity given its incorporation of multiple governments. While this
added level of complexity may suggest that all sources of input should be utilized in
order to promote better policy, Yang and Callahan (2005) find that governments do not
frequently seek citizen input in decision-making, functional areas that are managerial or
technical, or involve issues of confidentiality. Though this section of the research only
addresses two very basic questions about past and future involvement of citizens, these
questions provide a useful start for further exploration about whether citizen involvement
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is limited in regional policymaking. The following will examine responses to the two
questions, attempt to provide explanations, and suggest lines of inquiry for future
research.
The first question concerning actions taken to involve citizens in the interlocal
cooperation process is a question of citizenship and civic engagement. Generally
speaking, the hope is that our governmental and educational institutions are producing
“good” citizens, or those that are active in political processes (Westheimer and Kahne
2004; Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005). The benefits of active public participation
include, but are not limited to, increased citizen knowledge of society and its issues, as
well as tolerance and attachment to fellow citizens (Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005);
increased representation and responsiveness in administrative and political institutions,
increased political efficacy, and checks on administrative abuse (Cupps 1977); policy
based on public preference, social change, and efficiency benefits (Irvin and Stansbury
2004); and a reduction in the probability of litigation with policy stakeholders (Randolph
and Bauer 1999). On the other hand, Irvin and Stansbury (2004) outline a number of
disadvantages to citizen participation including greater cost, the difficulty of diffusing
citizen goodwill especially in larger communities, public complacency, unrealized
expectations due to lack of representation or authority, undue influence over decisions,
and persistent selfishness from the citizenry. Given the advantages and disadvantages
of public participation, public officials face the challenge of identifying when conditions
are optimal to include citizens in the policymaking process (Irvin and Stansbury 2004),
and when involving citizens, creating inventive ways for people to be involved (TheissMorse and Hibbing 2005).
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a. Town Hall and Other Public Meetings
When asked about past efforts to involve citizens in interlocal cooperation discussions,
many respondents noted the use of public gatherings. The primary method of reaching
out to citizens in the past was through town hall or community meetings, which
appeared nineteen (19) times out of forty-seven responses, or in 40.43% of responses.
In addition to town hall meetings, other respondents noted the use of focus groups (2)
and other types of group meetings (3). The type of public gathering used for discussing
interlocal agreements may depend on the issue itself. As one respondent noted, “For
complex items we have workshops to inform the public and share information, and allow
citizens to meet with me one-on-one to voice their concerns on the issue.”
Given the frequency of group-related responses, there is a need to discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of public meetings. Town hall meetings provide local
governments with the opportunity to gather information from citizens about what they
want from government in the future, with the potential of bringing a divided or weakened
community together (Evans-Cowley and Gough 2008). As a form of engagement, town
hall meetings are more involved affairs than others. In a typology of engagement, for
instance, Berger (2009) frames attending town hall meetings as a means for citizens to
be “engaged with” political affairs, a type of political engagement that is both active (as
opposed to passive) and attentive activity. Town hall meetings are considered active
because, ideally, they allow for two-way communication between citizens and their
representatives.
While the image of the New England-style town hall meeting has become iconic
to the image of participatory government in the United States, their usefulness as a
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modern policy tool has been questioned. Thesis-Morse and Hibbing (2005), for
instance, regard the town hall meeting as “a challenging and frustrating experience, one
that many people could do without” (244). Frustration arising from public meetings,
especially in the ILC context, may be the result of a single community voice dominating
discussions, leading to a very limited selection of possible policy alternatives. One of the
ideal conditions for citizen engagement efforts, identified by Irvin and Stansbury (2004)
is when key stakeholders are not too geographically dispersed. Given the regional
scope of ILC, it may be that attempting to engage citizens may not be appropriate for
this type of policy. Further, when focused on divisive policy issues, especially national
policy issues like healthcare reform, town hall meetings have resulted in angry and
violent protests (Shea and Sproveri 2012). Even the threat of conflict at a meeting may
be enough of keep some citizens at home. In a study of conflict avoidance and political
participation, Ulbig and Funk (1999) note that, “The kinds of face-to-face avenues for
participation such as town hall meetings and other forms of public deliberation are
precisely the venues most likely to keep the more conflict avoidant away from
politics” (277).
Certainly further research is needed concerning citizen engagement in the
context of interlocal cooperation beyond the scope of these two questions. For instance,
one question worth examining in future research is the scope of meetings in terms of
how many communities are typically involved in a public meeting. But one cannot help
but speculate that two of the major reasons for the high number of responses involving
town hall or other public meetings are 1) that public meetings are a traditional form of
engagement that have been repeatedly utilized in the past (meetings based on culture),
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and 2) that public meetings are not difficult to organize relative to other forms of
engagement (meetings based on ease or efficiency). With either explanation, breaking
from town hall meetings to another form of citizen engagement may be difficult. Years of
culture may be hard to break without a showing of success through another form of
engagement, perhaps from a neighboring jurisdiction. If the predominant factor driving
the use of town hall meetings is ease, especially where this form of engagement proves
less costly than others, even forms of engagement shown to be successful elsewhere
may not be within the government’s capacity to act.
b. Advertising
Another aspect of citizen communication found in the survey responses concerned the
means of informing and advertising utilized by mayors and their offices. The importance
of advertising in the electoral context is well-documented. Campaign spending on
advertising by challengers in city council elections, for instance, has been shown to
undermine electoral advantage, exerting more influence on incumbent vote share than
incumbent spending (Krebs 1998). More recently, Doherty and Adler (2014) found that
partisan direct mail, with both positive and negative messages, increases candidate
name recognition and likelihood of turning out to vote. Far less, however, is known
about advertising in the policy context, let alone the interlocal cooperation context.
In terms of advertising interlocal cooperation, past use of traditional media outlets
such as print, radio, and television were mentioned four (4) times combined, while the
use of electronic media such as webpages and social media sites was also mentioned
four (4) times by respondents. Based on the scarcity of responses involving advertising,
the first question to be addressed is why these counts are so low. This question is
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important to address because without some means of promotion, more substantive
forms of engagement such as town hall meetings may not reach their their full audience.
Two possible explanations are that advertising for local policy matter is either not
typically conducted or is not traditionally conducted by the office of the mayor. It may, in
fact, be the case that the only local policy matters that even warrant the use of
advertising are those that involve high salience problems or that might have the most
impact on the jurisdiction. But, in the case of interlocal cooperation, the problem is
already one that extends beyond boundary lines, so it would seem more likely that
these policy matters would be advertised if this was the case. If mayors are not the
traditional means of advertising policy matters though, a follow-up question could be
asked of who is the appropriate party for this task. Alternatively, the low response rate
could instead be attributed to mayors seeking to limit the scope of the policy discussion
to government officials and those most closely affected by the cooperative effort.
Though both response counts are low, the method of both informing and
advertising to the public is also a topic worth considering because different methods
may reach different audiences, especially in terms of age. A 2014 study performed by
the Pew Research Center, for instance, finds that among internet users in the youngest
adult age cohort (18-29), 87% have a Facebook account, 53% have an Instagram
account, and 37% have a Twitter account, each of which represent the highest
percentage of users within any cohort (Duggan, Ellison, Lampe, Lenhart, and Madden
2015). Given the strong presence of young adult users, communication by public
officials through these social networking platforms should be expected to reach this type
of audience more efficiently than other forms of media. Alternatively, communications in
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newspapers should reach older users. While yearly studies conducted by Nielsen
confirm that newspaper readership is dropping among all age cohorts, the largest
concentration of users is found among those that are 65 and older (Guskin 2014).
Future research concerning interlocal cooperation and communications with the public
might investigate whether elected officials are strategic in their media use decisions in
order to include or exclude certain segments of the population.
c. Citizen Demand and Inclusion
One of the major themes of this research has been overcoming the presumption of
scholars in the field that interlocal cooperation is not the realm of elected officials
because of their lack of clear benefit from involvement. This final section covering the
findings of qualitative survey questions reveals a similar sort of sentiment from mayors
of citizens and their interest in regional matters. When asked about activity to include
the public, one mayor responded that, “There is very little demand from the public on
these issues.” Another mayor, when asked about future means of reaching the public
noted, “Depends on the type. Not likely to involve citizens.” These mayors’ impressions
of citizen interest, and disinterest in involving them from the outset, may be wellfounded as interest in interlocal cooperation should require some knowledge of regional
issues. Besides the lack of a personal gain for elected officials, this same rationale is
used to explain why these agreements are generally considered the exclusive realm of
appointed administrators. It is not unreasonable to think that an elected official should
have a deeper understanding of regional issues than the average citizen, so why should
citizens be involved?
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What this discussion of citizen demand and inclusion brings into question is the
role of elected officials as providers of information on policy issues to the public. It may
be the case that the lack of demand is based on a lack of information flowing out of the
mayor’s office. And if the mayor is not the one to provide information to the public,
especially in smaller market cities where media outlets may not be as developed, who
fills this role? Further, if elected officials are not filling this role, what is their rationale for
not doing so? Relying on policy literature going back to Schattschneider (1965),
perhaps mayors are choosing to limit the scope of policy discussion in order to maintain
control over the direction of the agreement. Alternatively, mayors may simply lack the
political savvy or energy to make policy communications and issue awareness a top
priority.
IV. Conclusion
Whether city mayors, members of a city council, or other elected officials should choose
to communicate with officials from other governments or the public about matters of
regional policymaking would seem to be largely dependent on their inclusion into the
policymaking process by public administrators, barring situations where elected officials
act as a policy entrepreneur. As revealed in this study, elected officials do seem to be in
fairly regular contact with other officials generally, reporting monthly contact with both
other city officials and officials within their own county. Whether those discussions
regularly involve the possibility of cooperative efforts remains a lingering question, but at
the very least, those discussions involved at least one discussion of interlocal
cooperation in a year’s time for nearly two-thirds of those responding. Though the
connection between frequency of contact with other officials and discussion of
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cooperation was not drawn together in this study, the repeated contact with other
officials may be building the relationship of trust between community leaders that is so
essential to the success of interlocal agreements.
As a final consideration in this broad study of mayoral communications, most of
the discussion above appears to focus on communications at the beginning of the
policymaking process, but political communications do not stop there. Instead,
communications extend into program implementation and evaluation as well. As a report
titled “Selling Stakeholders on Interlocal Cooperation” prepared by the Michigan
Government Finance Officers Association states of program evaluation and ongoing
communications:
“Measure performance, relying on widely accepted benchmarks from well
respected organizations. This can help establish credibility and demonstrate to
the citizens what the benefits truly were. In turn, success breeds success, and
future [interlocal cooperation] endeavors will be much easier to
accomplish.” (Holdsworth 2007, 8)
In order to more fully understand mayoral communications in the interlocal cooperation
context, future studies could focus on several topics including a comparison of means of
communication throughout the policy process and means of reporting program
outcomes in instances of both program success and failure.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
The preceding chapters covered research on the topic of city mayors and their
involvement with a unique form of policy known as interlocal cooperation. In the opening
chapter, I provided several examples of how interlocal cooperation between different
local governments can achieve a variety of goals such as invigorating a blighted
downtown area, building a high-tech workforce, and improving emergency services.
Interlocal cooperation allows government to pursue a number of new and interesting
policy possibilities that more traditional methods of direct administration and even
contracting out to the private sector do not.
In the second chapter, which served as a broad literature review, I discussed
many of the benefits of interlocal cooperation. By combining resources across
jurisdictions, local governments can benefit in terms of fiscal efficiency and
responsiveness, but there are a number of other benefits that come along with this form
of collective action. For instance, in addition to the benefit of shared expertise, local
governments should also find that cooperative efforts provide more opportunities for
creative input by providing participants from multiple jurisdictions the chance to discuss
policy alternatives with each other. It is exactly this kind of creativity and ingenuity that
may be necessary to address the new and difficult challenges to local government that
lie ahead.
Viewed through the lens of federalism, interlocal cooperation may also provide
local governments with the opportunity to increase their share of governmental power
relative to the state and federal government. This opportunity may be especially
attractive to politicians and citizens in the southeastern region of the United States
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where fear of a distant and detached central government is still alive and well. By
concentrating power at the local level, interlocal cooperation should allow local
governments to maintain control over their programs and design those programs in a
way that could be more appropriate to their jurisdiction in terms of both political
acceptability and effectiveness.
The third and fourth chapters serve as my own unique contributions to the study
of elected officials and interlocal cooperation. In the third chapter, I identified several
correlations between tasks that mayors could perform within the stages of a cooperative
policy process and commonly used variables in this field, including length of term, city
size, city type, and racial homogeneity. In addition, two relatively new variables to this
line of study were tested: interest in higher office and value preference between
financial concerns and service quality. Using Spearman’s rank order correlation and the
Mann-Whitney U test, a number of statistically significant relationships were identified.
For instance, city size was found to be related to informing and educating the public
about the nature of the problem and possible solutions, networking to incorporate
individuals or groups with expertise, and collaborating with private parties. A likely
reason for the presence mayoral comfort with these tasks is the availability of a greater
number of private parties and policy experts in larger cities.
Findings related to racial homogeneity levels were surprising in that there were
statistically significant, negative relationships with informing and educating the public,
collaborating with other public officials and private parties, and delegating power. In
other words, as the racial homogeneity of a city is greater, mayoral comfort level with
these tasks diminishes. Though these findings seem to defy contemporary wisdom on
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the subject which views cooperation as more likely given greater homogeneity, it is
possible that mayors interpreted “comfort” as “need” to perform each task. In other
words, mayors might have felt less need to perform these tasks because of their
understanding of the presence of a uniform racial city composition.
In the fourth chapter, I examined the communications of city mayors with other
public officials and the public by employing both quantitative and qualitative methods.
Survey responses revealed that, on average, mayors are more likely to talk with elected
officials from other cities than those from their own county or a neighboring county.
When asked about contracting with another city or county government for services in
the last twelve months, 63% noted that they had. Looking at this question in more detail,
mayors from mayor-council type cities were far more likely to have had these
discussions than not, while mayors from council-manager type cities were more closely
split in their responses.
An additional set of findings from this chapter examined the relationship between
previous activity and productivity of citizens and citizen groups with mayoral comfort in
tasks associated with communication with the public. Basic descriptive statistics found
that mayors found citizen and citizen groups to be occasionally active in interlocal
cooperation discussions, and that when citizens and groups are active they are usually
productive. Examining the relationship with interlocal cooperation tasks, Spearman’s rho
correlations found statistically significant relationships between active citizens, active
citizen groups, and productive citizen groups with informing and educating the public of
the nature of the problem and possible solutions. Informing and educating the public
has a higher degree of political risk than does simply increasing public awareness, so
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mayors may need to have experienced greater involvement in the past in order to feel
comfortable with this task.
Finally, qualitative responses revealed mayoral thoughts about what they have
done in the past and what they plan to do in the future with regard to communicating
with the public about interlocal cooperation. Though there was some mention of
advertising through various methods, the response repeated most often when it asked
about previous efforts to involve citizens was through town halls. Previous literature
suggests that while town halls may be a source for information, they may also stifle
public interest, as they may be viewed as sources of challenge and conflict. Much more
concerning were responses from mayors stating that they had not and did not plan to
engage the public in interlocal cooperation. While the usefulness of engaging the public
in interlocal cooperation may be dependent on the policy type, proponents of a truly
representative government would argue that at the very least mayors should make an
effort to inform the public about any new or altered policy decisions.
I. Importance of the Research
Having recounted the work of the previous chapters, the final step before moving on to
future research considerations is to discuss why this research is important and what it
adds to the field of knowledge. The first clear contribution that this research provides is
an examination of city mayors and their attitudes toward interlocal cooperation, which is
a unique and underdeveloped area of inquiry thus far in the relevant literature. Mayors
are important public figures because, among other reasons, they can serve as a bridge
between policy experts and the public. Understanding mayoral attitudes toward
interlocal cooperation can help others in government direct mayors toward tasks that
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they feel comfortable performing and that may also benefit the public. Through better
utilization of mayors, cooperative efforts at the local level can improve and citizens can
become more knowledgeable about the workings of government in their area.
Additionally, while other interlocal cooperation research has included mayors as
part of a survey along with members of city councils over a relatively small region, this
research is important because it is the first study of interlocal cooperation to be directed
exclusively to mayors over a major geographic region of the United States. From a
research perspective, this study demonstrates that survey research on this topic of
mayors in large cities over a large geographic area is not only possible but can also be
potentially very fruitful. In the coming decades, further research should follow the lead of
this literature by being directed toward city mayors and their involvement in complex
forms of governance. Doing so will allow for the building of theory through a greater
accumulation of knowledge on this topic.
The design of this research has also been an important step for how interlocal
cooperation is considered in future research because, rather than relying on a simple
dichotomy of either support or opposition, this research has created a framework
through which the policy process of interlocal cooperation can be divided. This is not to
say that the notion of a multi-stage process is novel to the study of public policy, only
the application of the process to this particular form of policy. Like the evolution of policy
models in the past, the policy process presented in this research is very likely to be
modified in future research but at the very least this research provides a starting point
for others.
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Another major contribution that this research provides is further support for some
basic understandings about city mayors that have been assumed but have yet to be
found through empirical research. In Chapter 3, for instance, survey findings revealed
that mayors would feel most comfortable with performing the task of informing the public
of the nature of the problem to be addressed by interlocal cooperation, but feel least
comfortable with performing the task of crafting the specific terms of an interlocal
agreement. This finding supports what amounts to a common sense notion that less
complex and less politically polarizing tasks would be favored over more complex and
more politically polarizing tasks. Similarly, survey results presented in Chapter 4 found
that while all mayors surveyed had spoken with other government officials about
providing a public service through interlocal cooperation in the last year by a 2-to-1
ratio, mayors from mayor-council cities had done so at a far higher rate than their
counterparts in council-manager cities. Again, this result is expected as mayors in these
types of cities are provided with greater authority over matters of public policy. Both of
these results, along with others in this survey, provide support for basic assumptions
about how city mayors operate, which is important because they allow for future
research to stand on firmer theoretical ground.
Finally, this research is also notable for at least one thing that it did not find, that
being a lack of statistically significant correlations between tasks of the interlocal
cooperation process and progressive political ambition. Had such a finding been
present, it could have laid the groundwork for a theory of mayoral personality types that
might have been able to predict which mayors may be interested in higher office in the
future. On one hand, the lack of relationships seems to follow previous research by
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Bickers, Stein, and Post (2010) where the electoral connection between mayoral
candidates and interlocal cooperation was shown to be weak at best. Supporting
previous research is a positive contribution in that it allows for future research to focus
on other, less studied lines of inquiry.
On the other hand, however, the lack of an electoral connection may call for
alternative means of research to uncover the truth of mayoral attitudes. In other words,
this research may not have captured mayoral interest in higher office if mayors were
unwilling to reveal their true aspirations through the survey. If this is the case, then
perhaps the contribution of this research is to serve as a caution to those seeking
politically sensitive information from elected officials. Alternatively, it may simply be the
case that mayors would use interlocal cooperation as a means of building their own
brand name, but do not do so because they simply do not understand this form of
policy. With either of these alternatives, the contribution of this research is that it opens
up the door for many other forms of future inquiry such as those discussed below in the
next section.
II. Future Research Questions
The findings from this research represent a very modest step in the direction of
understanding how city mayors interact with government officials and the public in the
process of interlocal cooperation. Still, as a result of the insights gained through an
analysis of survey responses, a realization of potential corrections and additions to the
survey instrument, subsequently published work by other authors in the field, and
discovery of new aspects of interlocal cooperation, there are many additional research
questions that deserve attention moving forward.
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Looking first to inspiration from the survey instrument, some of the first questions
attempt to gauge how often elected officials talked with various city and county officials
and whether they have discussed interlocal cooperation within the last 12 months. In
order to connect the concepts of communication and interlocal cooperation, a future set
of questions should ask mayors whether interlocal cooperation has been discussed with
actors in each different governmental category and how often those discussions have
taken place. Even more specific questions might inquire about the settings of these
meetings and how the discussion was started. Are these discussions more likely to
occur in an open meeting where multiple governments are represented, or do these
conversations originate over the phone or in less formal settings? To what extent do
mayors attempt to engage members of minority populations in interlocal discussions?
Though this research seeks to understand how comfortable mayors are with articulating
the nature of the problem and with seeking out expert advice, there remains a
knowledge gap about whether mayors also seek guidance on the political repercussions
of an interlocal agreement. Could mayors use interlocal cooperation to empower a
traditionally undervalued population, such as a racial minority, when tensions exist
within the community? For instance, could a mayor champion a minority cause on a
regional scale in order to win back trust in government with a minority population? How
many and to what extent do mayors rely on their own staff in the formation of interlocal
agreements? What types of staff members are likely to be included in this process? Do
mayors in larger cities establish offices especially to handle regional issues?
One question posed on the survey of city mayors asked if there were any
additional comments that the respondent would like to make about his or her
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involvement with interlocal cooperation. Though this question went largely unanswered,
the majority of the answers that I did receive reflected a general sentiment of
cooperation over individual concern, such as the statements “It takes a team approach
to make our region better,” “Working together never hurts,” and “Can’t move forward
alone.” One respondent, very likely cued by questions concerning higher political
aspirations noted that, “If political interest is a consideration, the whole thing collapses.”
These comments are all encouraging because they seem to show that mayors are
aware that some policy issues need to be dealt with on a region-wide basis but do very
little to increase our understanding of their experience.
After having an initial reading of the survey responses, I noticed that one
question about “protecting the identity of my community” was left blank a handful of
times and others replied with only a question mark. Unfortunately, one of the
shortcomings of survey research, especially mail-only surveys, is the lack of flexibility in
the survey instrument. Here it appeared that the concept of community identity was not
fully understood by those that left the question blank, and quite possibly by some of
those that did respond, but there was no opportunity for the term to be formally defined.
Though defining and examining the concept of community identity beyond a common
sense understanding of what the term might mean would likely lead to an entirely new
set of research question far beyond the scope of this research, this concept is an
important one for the study of any relationship where one community could hold
significant sway over the future governance of another. This concern was reflected by
one respondent who stated that, “When there are equally shared interests and it does
not result in lost identity, interlocal cooperation can be the way to go.” At the
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governmental level, future research in this area might focus on how elected officials and
appointed administrators define their city’s identity or identities, how other communities
define a city’s identity, and specific concerns about how identity might be lost.
Community identity might also be evaluated by surveying community residents to see
how their concept of identity matches up with governmental concepts of identity and in
what contexts residents would be willing to sacrifice that identity for more efficient or
effective services.
One of the key variables that my research examines are differences in mayoral
involvement based on city structure. The distinguishing characteristic of city structure in
this study has been whether the city has a mayor-council or a council-manager form. As
noted in earlier chapters, this dichotomy represents a simplification of city structure in
that many cities would more accurately be described as a hybrid form of
government ,existing somewhere in between these two types based on the allocation of
power between city representatives. The city structure variable as used in this research
is also incomplete in that it does not take into account whether a mayor presides over
one of the three types of consolidated forms of government. On one hand this oversight
is understandable as, according to the National Association of Counties, only 40 such
consolidated governments exist in the United States. On the other hand, there are a
number of large cities among these 40, and these cities are likely to face a different set
of challenges than their non-consolidated counterparts.
One of the mayors that participated in the survey presides over a consolidated
city/county government and noted that consolidated government was “different than
other local governments.” According to the respondent, “Most interlocal cooperation that
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I have been involved with is working with other cities and counties in [the area]. Also, we
have discussions with ‘small’ or ‘satellite’ cities that existed in [the county] before
consolidation…” Though the mayor in question does not qualify how exactly his or her
city is “different,” simply referencing the topic of consolidation points to the need for
further study on the role of consolidated governments in interlocal cooperation. Due to
the small number of cities that qualify as a consolidated government, a case study or
comparison of case studies might evaluate how consolidated governments interact with
their neighbors and whether this interaction differs from cities of comparable size that
are not consolidated. It may be the case, for instance, that consolidated governments
take on a more substantial leadership role that other cities based on their command of
resources.
As a complement to the above comment from the consolidated city mayor,
another mayor from a surrounding city responded that, “As a ring city of [the
consolidated government], most of our interlocal agreements have been in place for
decades. As we move forward on infrastructure-related issues, these new agreements
will become extremely crucial.” Specifically, the mayor notes that new agreements
related to “mass transit and distributed fiber on the communications front” are on the
region’s agenda moving forward. This comment adds two new questions to the mix:
First, are the types of programs on the agenda of regions with “hubs” (larger cities, and
especially large consolidated cities), fundamentally different than those considered by
aggregations of smaller, more rural communities? It seems likely, for instance, that
these hub-based regions would be more likely to pool their resources to provide or
acquire services beyond simply meeting basic standards of living. Second, are the
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principles that lead to success in more basic service arrangements applicable to
arrangements for services that are on the cutting-edge of technology, such as regionwide partnership with communications providers to install “distributed fiber” wiring to
increase Internet access and speed in the area? This analysis would require the
creation of a typology of services and a fairly thorough list of rules or principles that
generally guide public officials when involved in cooperative ventures.
Another interesting aspect of interlocal cooperation that has not received enough
attention in the relevant academic literature is the role of state law and its influence on
local government. The response that drew my attention to this matter stated, “In [my
state], there is a natural friction between large municipalities and county government. Its
seeds are sowed in statutory powers and the divide of the role of government between
urban and rural citizens. This requires a great deal of work and understanding when
creating an interlocal framework.” Future research could take a broad approach by
gathering and comparing interlocal cooperation acts from each of the 50 states or in a
more narrow approach by examining the relationship between state, county, and city
governments in a case study manner.
A final question for mayors and their place in interlocal cooperation is the training
of elected officials in interlocal cooperation. Though there may be other sources of
training for elected officials, The National League of Cities includes 49 state municipal
leagues, each of which provides different training to their members. Some states, like
South Carolina, offer training in interlocal cooperation to city mayors and other elected
officials. Among the questions that could be answered about this training are which
states offer training, approximately how many city mayors or other elected officials

136

participate in this training, how long this training occurs, and what kinds of topics are
presented. If possible, it would also be useful to collect feedback from mayors that have
undergone this training to learn what lessons were new and broadened their
understanding of how interlocal cooperation could be used, any change in their
likelihood of seeking out or initiating regional policy discussions, and what questions
remain unanswered by their training. This line of research is an important new avenue
for the field of interlocal cooperation but is also relevant to a broader literature on policy
change. The advocacy coalition framework, for instance, posits that one source of policy
change is learning. This research on interlocal cooperation training can help to
demonstrate whether learning has taken place and has led to an actual change in public
policy processes.
III. Conclusion
Based on the growth of related literature in the field, it seems likely that interlocal
cooperation is the future of local governance and that public administration would
benefit greatly from considering all of the possible actors that could contribute to this
form of policy. Elected officials, in particular, may be able to contribute to the success of
cooperative efforts, helping both citizens of the region and themselves.
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Appendix A - Interlocal Cooperation Survey Instrument

MAYORS & INTERLOCAL COOPERATION:
ATTITUDES, BELIEFS, AND BEHAVIOR
August 2015
This survey is being distributed to mayors of large cities (i.e., those cities with a population greater than 50,000) across
ten states in the Southeast region (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee) as part of a research study on mayoral involvement in interlocal cooperation. In
recent years, city governments in the region have considered interlocal cooperation, sharing or contracting with other
local governments, for services such as police, fire, and libraries. While these shared and contract service models are
frequently discussed by city administrators and the media, we do not know about the extent to which mayors are involved in such arrangements. This survey is designed to gain insight into mayors’ attitudes, beliefs, and behavior when
dealing with the sharing and contracting of local government services with other local governments. (We are not asking
about your views on contracting with private sector firms.)
Your responses will be used for academic research. Your responses to this survey will remain confidential. A code number, only accessible to the researcher, identifies your responses. Your name and the name of your city will not be used
in research reports. The following questions will take about 15 minutes of your time. Thank you for your participation.
Your Background in Local Government:
What year were you first elected to your current office?

__________________

Never

A few
times
each year
or less

Once per
month

A few
times
each
month

At least
once per
week

How frequently do you talk with elected officials from other cities?

1

2

3

4

5

How frequently do you talk with elected officials from your county
government?

1

2

3

4

5

How frequently do you talk with elected officials from other county
governments?

1

2

3

4

5

How frequently do you attend meetings with elected officials from
outside of your own city government?

1

2

3

4

5

Within the last 12 months, has your city discussed contracting with another city
or county government to provide a service that you have traditionally provided on
your own?

Yes
No

To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements about your work as a mayor?
Please circle a number on the scale next to each statement.
Disagree

Agree

I promote the interests of my city when talking with other local
governments about sharing or contracting services.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I attempt to find solutions that will equally benefit my city and the
other local governments with whom we work.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I protect my city from becoming too dependent on contracts and
service sharing arrangements with other local governments.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I advocate for the interests of my city’s government employees
during any discussions about sharing or contracting services.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Protecting the identity of my community is a priority when making
decisions about local government services.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Forming working relationships with other local governments is
beneficial to my political career.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

152

Please open and continue the survey inside →

To what extent do you feel comfortable involving yourself with each of the following tasks associated with interlocal cooperation?
Please circle a number on the scale next to each statement.
Very
Very
Uncomfortable
Comfortable
Identifying problems that require interlocal cooperation.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Increasing public awareness of interlocal cooperation.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Informing and educating public of the nature of the problem and
possible solutions.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Networking to incorporate individuals or groups with issue
expertise.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Collaborating with other public officials.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Collaborating with private parties (individual citizens or groups).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Delegating power to other individuals or groups.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Creating the specific terms of interlocal agreements.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Implementing interlocal agreement activities or programs.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Monitoring of interlocal agreement activities or programs.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Evaluating the long-term success of interlocal cooperation.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Listed below is a set of values to be maximized by mayors when entering into shared of contract service agreements with other local
governments. Please rank each of these values to indicate how important they are to you when you enter into interlocal cooperation
discussions. Place 1 in the box next to the most important value, 2 next to the second most important issue and so on. Do not place
the same number in more than one box.

Equality of Citizen Access to Service
Financial Implications of the Agreement
Citizen Engagement in Formation
Service Quality
Political Career Interests

2
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Please continue the survey →

Citizen Involvement in Interlocal Cooperation:
In your experience, how active are individual citizens in interlocal cooperation
discussions?

Never active
Almost never active
Occasionally active
Usually active
Always active

In your experience, how productive has individual citizen activity been to
interlocal cooperation discussion?

Very productive
Somewhat productive
Neutral
Somewhat counterproductive
Very counterproductive

In your experience, how active are citizens groups in interlocal cooperation
discussions?

Never active
Almost never active
Occasionally active
Usually active
Always active

In your experience, how productive has citizen group activity been to interlocal
cooperation discussion?

Very productive
Somewhat productive
Neutral
Somewhat counterproductive
Very counterproductive

Which of the following types of citizens would you be most interested in working
with in interlocal cooperation discussions? (Check all that apply)

Business Leaders
Civic Leaders
Political Party Members
Legal Professionals
General Public
Other: ______________

What actions have been taken to involve citizens in interlocal cooperation discussions, by either you, your office, or any other
political actors involved in the process?

What actions would you take in the future, if any, to increase citizen involvement in interlocal cooperation discussions?

3
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Please continue the survey on the back →

Reminder: Your responses will be used for academic research only. Your responses to this survey will remain confidential. A code number, only accessible to the researcher, identifies your responses. Your name and the name of your city
will NOT be used in research reports.
Mayors, Interlocal Cooperation, & Politics:
How beneficial has your experience with interlocal cooperation been for your
ability to govern within your city?

Very beneficial
Somewhat beneficial
Neutral
Somewhat detrimental
Very detrimental

How beneficial has your experience with interlocal cooperation been for your
political reputation within your city?

Very beneficial
Somewhat beneficial
Neutral
Somewhat detrimental
Very detrimental

How beneficial has your experience with interlocal cooperation been for your
political reputation within outside of your city?

Very beneficial
Somewhat beneficial
Neutral
Somewhat detrimental
Very detrimental

How likely would you be to consider running for a higher office (e.g., governor,
member of Congress) at some point in your political career?

Extremely likely
Likely
Neutral
Unlikely
Extremely unlikely

Do you have any additional comments about your involvement with interlocal cooperation?

You have completed the survey. Thank you!
Please fold the survey like a regular letter and place it in the return envelope that is provided. If you
no longer have the return envelope, the survey can be mailed to: Mr. Stephen Adkins, P.O. Box
32876, Knoxville, TN 37930-2876. If you have any questions about this survey or about your participation in this study, you may contact Stephen Adkins at 865.207.8186 or by email at sadkins1@utk.
edu. Questions about your rights as a study participant, or comments or complaints about the study,
may also be addressed to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at irbchair@utk.edu or 865.974.7697.
4
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Appendix B - Qualitative Findings
1. What actions have been taken to involve citizens in interlocal cooperation discussions, by
either you, your office, or any other political actors involved in the process?

- 303 - “Davidson County has a unified county/city government. Most of my dealing with

-

interlocal discussions involve planning, roads and transit. Specific organizations — MPO,
RTA, Mayor’s Caucus — contain these discussions. Citizen participation through public
comment takes place at RTA and MPO meetings.”
307 - “Meeting every month with homeowners and residents associations.”
313 - “In working with the county to implement a new CRA and TIF district, we formed a
Citizens Advisory Committee which met prior to adoption of CRA.”
318 - “We have an extensive community plan that is developed by citizens and the
business community.”
319 - “TV, radio, print.”
321 - “Joint IT, risk management, EMA, HR, library, ADA compliance. School capital
[illegible].”
323 - “Identification of needs — input from professionals and public, formulating structure,
implementing objectives.”
327 - “There is very little demand from the public on these issues.”
330 - “We have had community meetings and do a news briefing show to keep citizens
involved.”
332 - “Direct invitation, advertisements, Facebook, website.”
334 - “Town hall meetings.”
340 - “Town hall meetings.”
343 - “Advertise meetings.”
344 - “Social media, town hall meetings, press conferences, council meetings, various
boards.”
355 - “Town hall and workshop forums, mailings and announcements dedicated to potential
interlocal options, surveys.”
356 - “We hold town hall meetings and set up citizen advisory and oversight panels.”
358 - “Tuscaloosa Forward, Transform Tuscaloosa County, PARA upgrades.”
359 - “None.”
360 - “Social media/communication.”
366 - “Accept oral and written comments, suggestions.”
368 - “Several groups currently, business groups, clubs and organizations, faith-based
groups.”
370 - “Public hearings.”
371 - “Held meetings and solicited input.”
373 - “Forums, open house discussions.”
375 - “Public to be heard at each meeting, and then acting on worthwhile proposals.”
379 - “Not much.”
383 - “Public safety.”
387 - “Initiating railroad crossing issues in neighborhood.”
388 - “Citizen focus groups, advisory boards, and commissions.”
389 - “EMS services, joint response agreement [fire and police].”
391 - “Advisory boards, appointments, drafting citizens.”
393 - “Facilitating town hall groups, appointing committees, implementing
recommendations.”
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-

-

397 - “Meetings are televised, on internet, advertised and encouraged!”
398 - “Open meetings.”
406 - “Small group meetings, larger public meetings.”
409 - “Series of public input sessions well in advance of the decision making process.”
413 - “Meetings involving combined law and fire services.”
414 - “We engage our neighborhood advisory boards as well as call upon our boards and
commissions for input.”
418 - “Open access to all area Sunshine Law.”
420 - “Mostly done by the City Manager.”
421 - “Boards and commissions. Citizens to be heard at council meetings.”
424 - “We allow public discussion at all our meetings. For complex items we have
workshops to inform the public and share information, and allow citizens to meet with me
one-on-one to voice their concerns on the issue.”
425 - “We are currently attempting to consolidate county-wide E911 dispatching, a sevencity consortium. To date, we have only involved emergency management experts from
each municipality. As we finalize the consolidation, it is imperative that a citizen and
business leadership group be brought in to assist to educate and disseminate information
about where we are with 911.”
427 - “Informing and involving community members through forums, press, mailings by
myself and city staff is a regular action to engage.”
428 - “Task teams, focus groups, surveys, town hall meetings, elected officials input.”
434 - “Notified my residents of zoning near our city borders being decided by adjacent city.
Held numerous town hall meetings in our city hall to host county and state officials.”
435 - “Usually staff driven.”

2. What actions would you take in the future, if any, to increase involvement in interlocal
cooperation discussions?

- 303 - “Public outreach is taking place on transit issues.”
- 313 - “Continue current actions.”
- 318 - “1) Allow for open meetings/town hall meetings, 2) Push information through media
-

-

outlets.”
319 - “Same as above” (“TV, radio, print.”)
321 - “Public forums, hearings, joint citizen review of issues.”
323 - “More public hearings.”
330 - “Continue to educate them on how they are affected. Sometimes they don’t know the
benefits or ramifications of such agreements.”
332 - “Marketing campaign through multiple sources.”
340 - “Better public notices where citizens will actually see them. Old mediums don’t work.”
343 - “None.”
344 - “Much of the same.”
356 - “We do a lot to engage our citizens in all aspects of policy setting. We are expanding
our use of social media to reach individuals who are not engaged in traditional community
communications programs. We also take surveys at places of employment, retail centers,
and schools.”
358 - “Continue to be transparent and open. Continue to leverage all types of media for
direct communication.”
368 - “Ongoing study to engage as many possible members of our city!”
370 - “Public hearings.”
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- 371 - “Provide the most transparent and open information available and hold meetings to
-

solicit input and feedback.”
373 - “Committee formation.”
374 - “Outreach, Internet.”
375 - “Whatever it takes.”
379 - “Work through our communications office to promote the issues.”
383 - “Street improvement.”
387 - “Setting priorities for road paving.”
388 - “Reach out more. Disseminate involvement using media sources.”
389 - “Forums.”
391 - “1) Meet one-on-one, 2) establish dialogue, 3) create a plan, 4) execute the plan, 5)
measure results.”
393 - “We continually assess and evaluate to be sure all citizens are involved and
informed. Different perspectives and resources are sought.”
397 - “Same as above.” (“Meetings are televised, on internet, advertised and encouraged!”)
398 - “None beyond targeted invitations.”
406 - “Depends on the nature of service — recreation and transportation are foremost
areas of intergovernmental partnerships — mostly positive. The wider the public show of
support, the better.”
409 - “Make sure we maximize social media and the use of our website.”
413 - “Bring awareness of all law enforcement, paramedic, and fire services [to] the local
media.”
415 - “Depends on the issue and its importance as perceived by citizens. Potentially focus
groups, meetings for stakeholder citizens.”
418 - “Create citizen involvement.”
420 - “Maybe step it up.”
421 - “Small group meetings, appeal to civic groups.”
424 - “Having more open dialogue and idea sharing with other cities.”
427 - “There is always room for improving our communicating with the public and we make
an effort to evaluate each encounter.”
428 - “Same as above.” (“Task teams, focus groups, surveys, town hall meetings, elected
officials input.”)
434 - “Improve communication to make citizens more aware of opportunities.”
435 - “Depends on the type. Not likely to involve citizens.”

3. Do you have any additional comments about your involvement with interlocal cooperation?

- 303 - “Metro Nashville/Davidson County is different than other local governments. Most
interlocal cooperation that I have been involved with is working with other cities and
counties in Middle Tennessee. Also, we have discussions with ‘small’ or ‘satellite’ cities that
existed in Davidson County before consolidation in 1963.”
- 327 - “It takes a team approach to make our region better. Teams have helped us land
[illegible] economic developments.”
- 332 - “When there are equally shared interests and it does not result in lost identity,
interlocal cooperation can be the way to go.”
- 358 - “In Alabama, there is a natural friction between large municipalities and county
government. Its seeds are sowed in statutory powers and the divide of the role of
government between urban and rural citizens. This requires a great deal of work and
understanding when creating an interlocal framework.”
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- 368 - “Can’t move forward alone. Must be at the table or ‘be part of the meal.’”
- 391 - “1) Very rewarding work, 2) natural (?) growth opportunity, 3) leveraging political
assets, 4) consensus building.”

- 405 - “If political interest is a consideration, the whole thing collapses.”
- 420 - “Working together never hurts.”
- 425 - “As a ring city of Nashville, most of our interlocal agreements have been in place for
decades. As we move forward on infrastructure-related issues, these new agreements will
become extremely crucial. Specifically, as a region we tackle items related to mass transit
and distributed fiber on the communications front.”
- 428 - “Public and private partnerships are key to a small city’s success in today’s world.”
- 434 - “We work closely with our adjacent cities on issues such as traffic, public safety,
development. We formed a regional 911 service, also have a regional police SWAT team to
better utilize services.”
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